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Abstract
This paper provides a general overview of the literature on the core of an exchange economy
with asymmetric information. Incentive compatibility is emphasized in studying core concepts at
the ex ante and interim stage. The analysis includes issues of non-emptiness of the core as well as
core convergence to price equilibrium allocations.
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1. Introduction
The core has proved to be a fruitful concept in analyzing cooperative outcomes in a
general equilibrium framework with complete information. Its connections with Walrasian
allocations also make it useful in understanding market economies. It is natural then to
examine the core of an economy in a more realistic setting in which agents possess pri-
vate information. While much has been done to understand the implications of incom-
plete information in non-cooperative games, as is well understood, outcomes generally
depend crucially on the precise speciﬁcation of the game. A cooperative approach based
on the core may then be useful in so far as it abstracts from the details of the negotiation
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procedure.1 An additional motivation for the cooperative approach is that it may help in a
better understanding of the various price equilibrium concepts that have been introduced in
economies with incomplete information.
The notion of the core is based on the premise that any group of agents (a coalition)
can cooperate and agree upon a coordinated set of actions which can then be enforced.
A ‘feasible’ allocation of an economy belongs to the ‘core’ if no coalition can ‘improve
upon’ it. At the outset, it should be recognized that this general description of the ‘core’ is
ambiguous in the context of an economy with incomplete information.
First, it is necessary to be precise about the meaning of a ‘feasible allocation’. In princi-
ple, an ‘allocation’ should now be seen as a state-contingent allocation satisfying physical
resourceconstraintsineachinformationstate.Butitisalsoimportanttodistinguishbetween
(i) the case in which private information eventually becomes publicly veriﬁable so that it
is not necessary to impose incentive compatibility restrictions on allowable allocations,
and (ii) the case in which private information is inherently unveriﬁable so that allowable
contracts must be self-enforcing with respect to private information, in the sense of being
incentive compatible.
Secondly, the meaning of ‘improve upon’ is not obvious. It depends on whether agents
enter into coalitional contracts at the ex ante stage (before any agent receives private infor-
mation)orattheinterimstage(aftereachagenthasreceivedherprivateinformation).Inthe
former case, expected utility (assuming von Neumann–Morgenstern utility representation)
is the appropriate measure of an agent’s well-being whereas in the latter case it is condi-
tional expected utility (conditional on private information) which provides the appropriate
measure.
Insum,anappropriatenotionofthe‘core’,attheveryleast,musttakeaccountofwhether
the coalitional decision stage is ex ante or interim, and whether or not incentive constraints
are relevant. This four-way taxonomy is inspired by the corresponding notions of efﬁciency
identiﬁedinHolmströmandMyerson(1983),andprovidesausefulperspectiveforviewing
the literature.2 The remainder of this section is structured with this taxonomy in mind.
However, we will argue that incentive compatibility constraints are an important ingredient
of a cooperative theory in asymmetric information economies, and for this reason our main
focus will be on results which incorporate incentive constraints in describing the feasible
allocations of each coalition.
1.1. The ex ante stage
Suppose cooperative agreements among agents are made at the ex ante stage for even-
tual consumption after the state of the world (the information state) is determined. The
state of the world may include information about preferences as well as individual
endowments.
1 This is not to say that the cooperative theory should not be informed by developments in the non-cooperative
theory. In fact, as we will argue, it is important even for cooperative theory, in environments with asymmetric
information, to incorporate non-cooperative considerations as embodied in incentive compatibility constraints.
2 The ex post stage, where decisions are made after the information state is known is no different from a model
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1.1.1. In the absence of incentive constraints
The simplest (classical) model to consider is one in which contracts are made ex ante but
the true state of the world becomes known to all agents, and is publicly veriﬁable, before
actual consumption takes place. In principle, therefore, any contract which satisﬁes the re-
source constraint can be enforced once it is agreed upon. (We will be assuming throughout




commodity markets are complete, the notion of an Arrow–Debreu equilibrium is similar
to that of a Walrasian equilibrium in an economy without uncertainty. Of course, one can
apply to this economy the standard notion of the core. If preferences are represented by von




as the ex ante core of an Arrow–Debreu economy. It should be clear that this core bears the
samerelationshiptotheArrow–DebreuequilibriaasthecoredoestotheWalrasianequilibria
in an economy without uncertainty. In particular, an Arrow–Debreu equilibrium allocation
belongs to the ex ante core of the Arrow–Debreu economy; both sets are non-empty under
standard assumptions; as in Debreu and Scarf (1963), the set of allocations that remain in
the core with replication converges to the set of Arrow–Debreu allocations.
It is also possible to consider a similar model but with asymmetric uncertainty in the
sense that a coalition is restricted to using an allocation which is contingent only on the
combined information of agents within the coalition. This translates into a corresponding
measurability restriction on the allocations allowable to each coalition, as in Allen (1993)
and Koutsougeras and Yannelis (1993) (discussed in Section 4). Note, however, that the
resulting core contains the core of the Arrow–Debreu economy (since objections are made
more difﬁcult onlyfor subcoalitions of the grand coalition) and is, therefore, non-empty.
1.1.2. Incentive compatibility
Suppose that agents make coalitional decisions at the ex ante stage but each agent re-
ceives (at the interim stage) private information which is not publicly veriﬁable before
consumption takes place. Many interesting economic issues in the presence of incomplete
information, such as adverse selection and moral hazard, pertain to such situations. In this
case,theenforcementofastatecontingentallocationreliesonagents’claimsregardingtheir
private information. An agent who possesses information that is not available elsewhere in
the economy may not have the incentive to truthfully reveal this information, i.e. a state
contingent contract may be subject to strategic manipulation and, therefore, unenforceable.
This is so even if there are no limits on communication among agents. More precisely,
agents in a coalition may use any communication mechanism.3 But the only allowable state
3 In keeping with the usual story that when a coalition forms it cannot rely on the resources of the complement,
it is natural to also insist that it cannot communicate with those in the complement (as in the last paragraph of
Section 1.1.1). In other words, a coalition must rely on a communication mechanism deﬁned with respect to the
private information of agents within the coalition; see Section 4.1.4 F. Forges et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 1–41
contingent contracts are those which are induced by Bayesian Nash equilibria of the corre-
sponding communication game.4 By the revelation principle (see, for example, Myerson,
1991), every such state contingent allocation is generated by a (Bayesian) incentive com-
patibledirectmechanism.Hence,whenincentiveconstraintsarerelevant,astatecontingent
allocation is more appropriately viewed as a direct mechanism. (We will sometimes use the
term ‘mechanism’ even when incentive constraints are not imposed but this should cause
no confusion.)
Deﬁne the set of feasible mechanisms for a coalition as those which satisfy incentive
compatibility as well as the usual physical feasibility constraints. The corresponding char-
acteristic function is now well-deﬁned, and the ex ante incentive compatible core is simply
thesetofincentivecompatiblemechanismssuchthatnocoalitioncanincreasetheexpected
utility of each member by choosing another incentive compatible mechanism using its own
resources and information.
Non-emptiness of the ex ante incentive compatible core is not assured under the usual
assumptions on the economy, as shown in Forges et al. (2002) and Vohra (1999); see
Section 4.2. Positive results have, however, been obtained under a variety of additional
assumptions5 which we will discuss in Section 4.3. As shown by Forges et al. (2001),i t
is also possible that convergence to a corresponding notion of a market equilibrium does
not obtain under the usual assumptions. As we explain in Section 6, convergence results do
depend on the nature of the replication procedure.
1.1.3. (Private) measurability vs. incentive compatibility
To deal with the case in which private information does not become public, a different
approach is often followed in the literature on market equilibria. If an agent trades with
the anonymous market rather than with other agents directly, it is natural to require that
an agent’s trade be measurable with respect to her private information. The equilibrium
notion introduced in Radner (1968) modiﬁes the notion of an Arrow–Debreu equilibrium
precisely by incorporating such measurability restrictions on agents’ trades. An analo-
gous ex ante core concept, the private core, is studied in Allen (1993) and Koutsougeras
and Yannelis (1993), and a similar interim concept in Yannelis (1991).6 The private core
is related to equilibrium allocations in the sense of Radner (1968) in the same way as
the core of the Arrow–Debreu economy is related to Arrow–Debreu equilibrium allo-
cations. And non-emptiness and core convergence can be established under standard
assumptions.7
However, the private measurability restriction, which is natural in the context of market
equilibrium concepts, may not be appropriate in the context of the core. There are two
reasons for this.
4 Thus, in describing the cooperative possibilities available to a coalition it becomes necessary to rely on
non-cooperative considerations in so far as contracts are contingent on private information.
5 See Allen (1992), Forges and Minelli (2001), Forges et al. (2002), Ichiishi and Idzik (1996), McLean and
Postlewaite (2000) and Vohra (1999).
6 Measurability with respect to σ-algebras obtained from other forms of information sharing within a coalition
lead to correspondingly different versions of the core; see Section 4.2 and the references cited therein.
7 See Page (1997) and Yannelis (1991) for non-emptiness results in a model with a continuum of states, and
Einy et al. (2001a) for convergence results.F. Forges et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 1–41 5
First, the very notion of the core is based on agents making agreements to trade among
themselves,notthroughananonymousmarket.Thisclearlyinvolvescommunicationamong
agents, and it is then unreasonable to impose the restriction that an agent cannot entertain
a contract which varies with information he does not possess. Of course, strategic con-
siderations cannot be ignored in considering such a contract and incentive compatibility
is therefore an important consideration. A possible rationale for requiring measurability
with respect to private information is that, in an exchange economy, (under appropri-
ate assumptions) it implies incentive compatibility; see Allen (1993), Koutsougeras and
Yannelis (1993) and Section 4.1.1. But the converse is not true. There may exist many
incentive compatible mechanisms only some of which (constant ones) satisfy private mea-
surability, as in Example 2. In short, if incentive considerations are relevant they should be
incorporated directly; measurability with respect to private information may be an unduly
strong restriction.
Second,inamarketequilibriumsuchasafullyrevealingrationalexpectationsequilibrium
(Radner, 1979), communication through prices can make superﬂuous the a priori (strong)
assumption of private measurability of trades. (There may exist a rational expectations
equilibrium allocation which is incentive compatible but not measurable with respect to
privateinformation;seeExample2.)Ofcourse,thisformofcommunicationisnotavailable
in the context of the core.
1.2. The interim stage
In many economic situations, agents already have private information when they con-
template engaging in state contingent trades with others. In other words, coalitions form at
the interim stage rather than ex ante. As in the previous section, we begin by considering a
model in which incentive constraints are not relevant and then turn to one incorporating in-
centivecompatibilityconstraints.OurpreviousdiscussiononmeasurabilityinSection1.1.3
continues to apply to the interim stage.
1.2.1. In the absence of incentive constraints
Suppose incentive constraints are not relevant. We place ourselves in the same model as
in Section 1.1.1 except that agents already have their private information. In what follows,
we rely crucially on the seminal contribution of Wilson (1978) on this subject. However,
we shall ﬁnd it convenient to formulate private information in terms of agents’ types. This
framework is equivalent to one in which private information is speciﬁed as a partition of the
underlyingsetofstates,asinWilson(1978),butisespeciallyusefulinformulatingincentive
compatibility constraints; see Section 2 for further details. Let Ti denote the (ﬁnite) set of
agent i’s types. An information state then refers to a proﬁle of types (ti) ∈ T ≡
 
i Ti. The
interpretation is that i knows her type, and for every ti ∈ Ti has a probability distribution
on T−i conditional on ti. Of course, at the interim stage, the relevant utility function for
an agent is then the conditional expected utility function—conditional on her type (private
information). For the remainder of this section, the term ‘better-off’ for i of type ti refers
to an increase in the value of some conditional expected utility function, Ui(·|ti).
It is not immediately obvious how the core ought to be deﬁned for such an economy.
More precisely, it is not obvious how the characteristic function should be constructed for6 F. Forges et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 1–41
the interim economy. What is the meaning of a coalitional improvement? Should it require




For example, consider the coalition consisting of agent i alone. Since i knows her type, say
ti, surely i will ‘object’ to a status-quo if she is better-off (an increase in Ui(·|ti)) with her
own endowment. In other words, for an objection from a singleton coalition, {i}, it sufﬁces
that some type (not necessarily all types) of agent i can do better with her endowment. (The
readerwillnoticethatthisisindeedconsistentwiththestandardnotionofinterimindividual
rationality as, for example, in (10.7) and (10.8) on p. 485 of Myerson, 1991.) Fortunately,
there is a formal way of deﬁning objections for an arbitrary coalition which reconciles this
seeming asymmetry in the way we have just deﬁned objections for the grand coalition and
for singleton coalitions.
Thestatementthatallagentsofalltypescanbemadebetter-offturnsouttobeessentially
equivalent to the statement that there is an informational event E ⊆ T which is common
knowledgeto all i and all agents of all types in E can be made better-off (over E). And
the statement that agent i of type ti is better-off means that there is an informational event
known to i (common knowledge to i) over which she is better-off. This idea, of an ‘interim
objection’ by a coalition being common knowledge among members of the coalition, is
the basis for the notion of the coarse core deﬁned by Wilson (1978). A state contingent
allocation belongs to the coarse core if there does not exist a coalition S,a ne v e n tE which
is common knowledge to all members of S, and a state contingent allocation feasible for
S which makes all agents in S better-off over the event E. Wilson (1978) showed that
the coarse core is non-empty under the standard assumptions on an economy. However,
convergence of the coarse core to market equilibrium allocations does not generally hold,
as shown by Serrano et al. (2001).
Therestrictionthatobjectionsbecoordinatedonacommonknowledgeeventismotivated
bythestandardissuesofadverseselection;seetheexamplesinWilson(1978)andExample
1.9 While there is no doubt that coalitions should be permitted to object over a common
knowledgeevent,therearesituationsinwhichitcanbearguedthatcoalitionscandomore—
they can share private information and thereby focus an ‘objection’ over an event which
is not necessarily common knowledge. In the extreme case, one may allow agents in a
coalition to choose how much of their private information they share among themselves, as
in the ﬁne core of Wilson (1978). But one can argue that this, too, is ad hoc. It is clearly
desirable to develop a theory in which the amount of information shared by members of
a coalition is endogenous. This issue, of information leakage, motivates the notion of a
durable decision rule in Holmström and Myerson (1983). And similar ideas can be applied
todevelopalternativenotionsofthecorefortheinterimstage,aswediscussinSection5.3.10
8 This is modulo the difference between an improvement and a strict improvement. See Section 3 for a formal
deﬁnition, further justiﬁcation, and examples.
9 Itisalsopossibletocharacterizethecoarsecoreintermsofaxioms,includingappropriatenotionsofconsistency
and converse consistency, as shown by Lee and Volij (1996).
10 While this is a conceptually difﬁcult and as yet unsettled issue, there are several papers on the topic, including
Dutta and Vohra (2001), Ichiishi and Sertel (1998), Lee and Volij (1996) and Volij (2000).F. Forges et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 1–41 7
1.2.2. Incentive compatibility
If private information does not become publicly veriﬁable, for the reasons mentioned in
Section 1.1.2, it is appropriate to introduce feasible mechanisms which satisfy incentive
compatibility constraints in addition to the resource constraints.11 It is now straightforward
to deﬁne an analog of the coarse core in this setting—the incentive compatible coarse
core—simply by restricting attention to incentive compatible and feasible allocations. Not
surprisingly, incorporating incentive compatibility does make a signiﬁcant difference. Note
thatanallocationinthiscoreneednotbeﬁrst-best/classicallyefﬁcient,i.e.itispossiblethata
mechanisminthiscoreisinterimParetodominatedbyonewhichisnotincentivecompatible.
Under standard assumptions, there do exist mechanisms which are interim individually
rational, incentive compatible and interim incentive efﬁcient. Thus, the non-emptiness of
the incentive compatible coarse core is not in doubt for a two-agent economy. There are
other sufﬁcient conditions, principally the case of non-exclusive information, discussed in
Section 5, under which this core is non-empty. But, in general, the incentive compatible
coarse core may be empty, as shown in Forges et al. (2002) and Vohra (1999). Identifying
other sufﬁcient conditions under which non-emptiness obtains remains an important issue
for future work.
Therestofthispaperisorganizedasfollows.InSection2,weintroducethebasicnotation
and model. In Section 3, we review the Holmström and Myerson (1983) deﬁnitions of
efﬁciency in incomplete information economies. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the core concepts
and the issue of non-emptiness corresponding respectively to the ex ante and the interim
stage. In Section 6, we turn to the question of core convergence.
2. The basic economy
Weconsideranexchangeeconomywithnagentsandl goods.Thesetofagentsisdenoted
N ={ 1,...,n}. The private information of agent i ∈ N is represented by i’s type, ti ∈ Ti,
where Ti is a ﬁnite set. Let us set T =
 n
i=1 Ti and let us denote as t = (ti)i∈N a typical
elementofT torepresenttheinformationstate.Letq beaprobabilitydistributionoverT.W e
assume,withoutlossofgenerality,thattherearenoredundanttypes,i.e.q(ti)>0,∀ti ∈ Ti.
It should be stressed that q(t) = 0 for some t ∈ T is allowed for. This is important since
it permits the model to capture aspects of uncertainty which may be commonly known to




it is essential to specify what the outcome is for every possible proﬁle of claims regarding
private information. And this, in effect, makes it necessary to consider outcomes over T.
We assume that each agent i has an initial endowment ei ∈ Rl
+, which does not depend
on his type. Although this assumption can be relaxed (see Forges et al., 2002; Vohra, 1999),
11 In another context, Demange and Guesnerie (2001) consider various concepts of interim cores with incentive
compatibility in dominant strategies. A similar approach is followed by Hara (2000), who, in an economy with
private values, proves the equivalence between the allocations in his notion of interim incentive compatible core
and the (ex post) Walrasian allocations.8 F. Forges et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 1–41
werefrainfromdoingsointheinterestsofsimplicity.Agenti’spreferencesarerepresented
by a (von Neumann–Morgenstern) utility function
ui : T × Rl
+ → R,i = 1,...,n
such that ∀t ∈ T,ui(t,·) is increasing, continuous and concave. In particular, agent i’s
preferences can depend on the other agents’ types (as in Akerlof, 1970, for instance). The
basic economy is thus
E ={ N,(Ti,u i,e i)i∈N,q}.
The model is interpreted as follows: nature ﬁrst chooses t in T according to q; every agent
i is only informed of his own type ti; consumption takes place afterwards. Three stages of
information can be distinguished: ex ante, i.e. before the agents learn their types, interim,
i.e. when every agent only knows his own type, and ex post, i.e. when all types are revealed
publicly. Observe that in terms of negotiations over allocations, the ex ante stage and, even
moreso,theexpoststagemaybeﬁctitious;coalitionalcontractsmayactuallybenegotiated


















denote the set of feasible allocations (in each state). A feasible (direct) mechanism is a
function,
µ : T → X.
NotethatastatecontingentallocationisalsoafunctionfromT toX.Conceptually,however,
a state contingent allocation is different from a mechanism; a mechanism should be seen as
a means to ‘implement’ a state contingent allocation.
If types are not veriﬁable, it becomes necessary to restrict attention to those mechanisms
which are also informationally feasible. This is so even if there are no impediments to
communication. Formally, agents may use any communication game in order to achieve
a state contingent allocation. A communication game in our model starts with the move
of nature choosing types in T according to q, speciﬁes a set of messages Mi (or strategic
choices) for each agent i and associates an outcome in X to each proﬁle of messages,
with resulting payoffs depending on types through the utility functions ui(·). A (pure)
strategy of agent i in this game is a mapping from Ti to Mi.12 The informationally feasible
allocations (from T to X) are those which correspond to a (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium
of such a communication game. Fortunately, we do not need to consider the entire class
of communication games. By the revelation principle (see, for example, Myerson, 1991),
one can construct, for any Nash equilibrium of some communication game, an equivalent
truthful Nash equilibrium of a direct communication game, which induces exactly the same
allocation from T to X. The direct communication game, in which the set of messages
12 In most of the paper, we focus on pure strategies and hence on deterministic mechanisms. We will turn to
random mechanisms in Section 4.3.1.F. Forges et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 1–41 9
of each agent i is canonically (a copy of) Ti is fully described by a mechanism µ, which
should thus be viewed as deﬁned over reported types. At the interim stage, every agent i
must report a type si ∈ Ti and receives thereafter the allocation µi(s), where s = (si)i∈N.
The conditions which express that telling the truth is a Nash equilibrium of the direct game
are referred to as incentive compatibility constraints.13
The explicit incentive compatibility conditions are easily derived. By reporting si, agent




q(t−i|ti)ui[ti,t −i,µ i(si,t −i)]. (1)
For si = ti, let
Ui(µ|ti) = Ui(µ|ti,t i)






Mechanism µ is incentive compatible if and only if
Ui(µ|ti) ≥ Ui(µ|ti,s i) ∀i ∈ N, ∀ti,s i ∈ Ti. (2)
3. Efﬁciency
Holmström and Myerson (1983) distinguish six concepts of efﬁciency depending on
the stage at which the agents’ welfare is evaluated (ex ante, interim or ex post) and on
whether incentive compatibility matters or not. They ﬁrst introduce three different notions
of domination for mechanisms.
Let µ and ν be feasible mechanisms:
ν ex ante dominates µ if and only if
Ui( ν )>U i(µ) ∀i ∈ N,
ν interim dominates µ if and only if
Ui(ν|ti)>U i(µ|ti) ∀i ∈ N, ∀ti ∈ Ti,
ν ex post dominates µ if and only if
ui(t,ν(t)) > ui(t,µ(t)) ∀i ∈ N, ∀t ∈ T.
We have departed slightly from the formal deﬁnition in Holmström and Myerson (1983)
in using strict inequalities rather than weak inequalities and one strict inequality. This is
13 We restrict ourselves to Bayesian incentive compatibility; Allen (1992, 1994) also considers an extremely
strong version of incentive compatibility in dominant strategies.10 F. Forges et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 1–41
simplytokeepthenotionofdominationcomparabletothewayinwhichitisusuallydeﬁned
in the context of the core. It does not make any essential difference to the results we shall
discuss.
Note in particular that the notion of interim domination requires that all types of all
agents gain. This may be the only way in which an outsider can verify a Pareto improve-
ment at the interim stage. It is also consistent with the phenomenon of adverse selection.
Consider,forinstance,asimpleexampleofinsuranceacrosstwostates,s andt.Ifoneagent
knows the true state and the other does not, an interim Pareto improvement must ensure
that the informed agent is better-off in both states; see Example 1 in Wilson (1978) and
Example 1.
Let µ be a feasible mechanism; µ is ex ante (respectively, interim, ex post) classically
efﬁcient if and only if there is no feasible mechanism that ex ante (respectively, interim, ex
post)dominatesµ.Assumefurtherthatµisincentivecompatible;µisexante(respectively,
interim, ex post) incentive efﬁcient if and only if there is no incentive compatible feasible
mechanism that ex ante (respectively, interim, ex post) dominates µ.
Obviously, ex ante efﬁciency implies interim efﬁciency, which in turn implies ex post
efﬁciency, and this holds for both the classical and incentive notions. Holmström and
Myerson (1983), p. 1807, argue that only three concepts of efﬁciency are relevant: ex
ante incentive efﬁciency, interim incentive efﬁciency and ex post classical efﬁciency. In
particular, they deﬁne incentive ex post efﬁciency only for taxonomy purposes; we will
therefore refer to ex post efﬁciency to denote the classical concept. If the agents must
select a mechanism at the ex ante or the interim stage,14 and cannot commit to report
their types honestly, then incentive ex ante or interim efﬁciency are the appropriate efﬁ-
ciency concepts. It is well-known (and illustrated by Example 1) that incentive compat-
ibility can be an important restriction in the sense that an incentive efﬁcient mechanism
need not be classically efﬁcient.15 In the next section, we shall extend these two notions
of incentive efﬁciency in order to deﬁne the ex ante and the interim incentive compatible
core.
We end this section with a couple of illustrative examples. Example 1 highlights the
impactofincentiveconstraints;aninterimincentiveefﬁcientmechanismneednotbeexpost
efﬁcient.Example2showsthedifferencebetweenincentivecompatibilityandmeasurability
restrictions on mechanisms; none of the mechanisms which are measurable with respect to
private information may be interim incentive efﬁcient.
Example 1 (Market for lemons). There are two consumers and two commodities. Suppose
T1 ={ s,t} while agent 2 is uninformed (and therefore has only one type). The information
14 Observe that the agents can face the problem of choosing a mechanism only at the ex ante or the interim stage,
and that such a decision problem only makes sense if they can communicate at the interim stage. We maintain
these assumptions throughout the paper but mention alternative ones in Section 4.
15 For sufﬁcient conditions under which all incentive efﬁcient mechanisms are ﬁrst best (or classically) efﬁcient,
see Section 4.3.1. In an exchange economy with state independent endowments and monotonic preferences there
alwaysexistsanexpostclassicallyefﬁcientmechanismwhichisincentivecompatible—forexample,a‘dictatorial’
mechanism which assigns the aggregate endowment to a particular agent in all states. But, in other models, it is
possible that no classically efﬁcient mechanism is incentive compatible; see Holmström and Myerson (1983) for
an example.F. Forges et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 1–41 11
state can then be described by s or t. Suppose s and t are equally probable. Let e1 = (1,0)
and e2 = (0,1).
ui(s,x1,x2) = x2,i = 1,2.
u1(t,x1,x2) = x1 + x2,u 2(t,x1,x2) = 1.5x1 + x2.
(Throughout, we will use superscripts to index commodities and subscripts to index con-
sumers.) Let z1 denote the net trade of consumer 1. The no-trade mechanism z∗, where
z∗
1(s) = z∗
1(t) = (0,0), is not interim (or ex ante) efﬁcient since the mechanism z 
1(s) =
(0,0.1), z 
1(t) = (−0.9,1) interim Pareto dominates it. However, it is easy to check that z∗
is interim incentive efﬁcient. (An interim improvement for agent 1 in state t requires a trade
at which the effective price of commodity 1 is greater than the price of commodity 2. How-
ever, incentive compatibility then implies the same trade in state s, which results in a lower
expected utility for agent 2.) Note also that z∗ is not ex ante incentive efﬁcient since it is
dominated(exante)bythe(incentivecompatible)tradezwherez1(s) = z1(t) = (−1,0.6).
Thus, an interim incentive efﬁcient mechanism need not be ex post (classically) efﬁcient
nor ex ante incentive efﬁcient. The fact that z does not interim dominate z∗ points, again,
to the importance of making both types of the informed agent better-off at the interim stage
(adverse selection).
Example 2. The information structure is the same as in Example 1. The endowments (in
both states) are e1 = e2 = (1,1), and the utility functions are
u1(s,x1,x2) = x1,u 1(t,x1,x2) = x2,
u2(s,x1,x2) = u2(t,x1,x2) = x1 + x2.
Consider the mechanism with net-trades z, where z1(s) = (1,−1) and z1(t) = (−1,1).
This is incentive compatible as well as ex ante (and, therefore, also ex post) classically
efﬁcient. Clearly then, it is interim incentive efﬁcient. Thus, incentive compatibility can
be satisﬁed without sacriﬁcing efﬁciency; the uninformed agent can safely delegate to the
informed consumer the decision on how to trade.
The allocation corresponding to z is also the unique Arrow–Debreu equilibrium with
the relative price equal to 1 in each state. (If in any state the relative price is not 1, the
demand from agent 2 will violate the feasibility condition.) However, this allocation is not
measurable with respect to the private information of the uninformed consumer, requiring
her to trade contingent on information she does not possess. Since the relative prices are
the same in both states, prices cannot reveal information and this allocation is, therefore,
not a rational expectations equilibrium allocation. In fact there does not exist a rational
expectations equilibrium. In this example, measurability is a very strong requirement while
incentivecompatibilityisnot.Noticealsothattheno-trademechanism,z∗,cannotbeinterim
dominated by any privately measurable mechanism. But it is interim dominated by the
incentive compatible mechanism z , where z 
1(s) = (0.9,−1) and z 
1(t) = (−1,0.9).
Modify the example so that u2(t,x1,x2) = αx1 + x2, where α  = 1. Then there exists
a fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium but the corresponding allocation is not
privately measurable.12 F. Forges et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 1–41
4. The ex ante incentive compatible core
In this section, we extend the model developed in the previous two sections by allowing
agentstoformcoalitions.Weﬁrstdeﬁnetheexanteincentivecompatiblecore.Weillustrate
by a counter-example that the non-emptiness of this core cannot be guaranteed in general.
We then identify special classes of economies in which the core is non-empty. In one of
these classes, random mechanisms are crucial for the positive result.
4.1. Deﬁnition
Analogoustothedeﬁnitionofafeasiblemechanism(forthegrandcoalition)µ : T  → X
as in Section 2, we can now deﬁne a feasible mechanism for a coalition, namely a subset






ei ∀t ∈ T. (3)
Let the set of mechanisms satisfying (3) be denoted FS. Since a mechanism is usually
interpreted as a communication device in a coalition, it is also appropriate to require it to
depend only on information available within the coalition. A mechanism, µ, for S should
be measurable with respect to the information available to S, i.e.





for coalition S. A mechanism µ ∈ Fm
S is incentive compatible for S if it satisﬁes (2) for all
i ∈ S. Let F∗
S denote the set of feasible and incentive compatible mechanisms for S (where
“∗”a si nHolmström and Myerson, 1983 indicates incentive compatibility), i.e. F∗
S is the
set of all mechanisms satisfying (2)–(4).




















then a mechanism in Fm
S can be seen as a mapping from TS to XS.16 This formulation can
sometimes be more convenient, as we will see in Section 4.3.2.
Let µ ∈ F∗ and let νS ∈ F∗
S for some coalition S. In the same way as in Section 3, νS
ex ante dominates µ for coalition S if and only if
Ui(νS)>U i(µ) ∀i ∈ S.
The ex ante incentive compatible core is the set of all mechanisms µ ∈ F∗ that are not
ex ante dominated by any mechanism νS ∈ F∗
S for any coalition S.17
16 Using the notation of Section 2, T ≡ TN, X ≡ XN, etc. Note that FN ≡ F = Fm and Fm∗
S = F∗
S.
17 Observe that the set of corresponding expected payoffs is just the standard core of the game deﬁned by the
characteristic function
V ∗(S) ={ v ∈ Rn|∃µS ∈ F∗
S suchthatvi ≤ Ui(µS) ∀i ∈ S}.F. Forges et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 1–41 13
We have focused on incentive compatible mechanisms that cannot be blocked by any
coalition at the ex ante stage.In a similar way as in Section 3, one can also consider the
“classical” ex ante core, which does not take account of incentive compatibility constraints.
If incentive compatibility does not matter at all, it may be reasonable to allow coalitions to
use allocations contingent on the entire type proﬁle, i.e. to dispense with the measurability
conditions (4) and consider any mechanism in FS. As we pointed out in Section 1.1.1, the
correspondingcoreisthenthecoreofanArrow–Debreueconomywithcompletecontingent
markets, to which all classical (existence, convergence) results apply. Restricting coalition
S’sfeasibleallocationstoFm
S justreducesthesetofobjections(whileFm = F),sothatthe
associated core is still non-empty (this core corresponds to the “ﬁne core” in Allen, 1993
and to the “weak ﬁne core” in Koutsougeras and Yannelis, 1993).18
Alternativemeasurabilityrestrictionshavebeenconsideredintheliterature.Forinstance,
agents in a coalition may be forbidden to communicate information in any way, leading to
feasible sets for coalitions which are even more restricted than Fm
S .19
More interestingly, every individual can be restricted to allocations that are measurable
with respect to his own private information, which generates the “private core” (using
the terminology of Yannelis, 1991; see also Allen, 1993; Ichiishi and Idzik, 1996; Hahn
and Yannelis, 1997; Koutsougeras and Yannelis, 1993). A possible rationale for private
measurabilityisthat,underappropriateassumptions,itimpliesincentivecompatibility(see,
e.g. Allen, 1993; Koutsougeras and Yannelis, 1993). We turn to a clariﬁcation of this point
in the next section. (The reader may move to Section 4.2 without any loss of continuity.)
4.1.1. Private measurability and incentive compatibility
In our model, a mechanism µ satisﬁes private measurability if for every i, µi(t) depends
only on ti. In other words:
∀i ∈ N, µi(t) = µi(t ) ∀t,t  ∈ T : ti = t 
i.
The difference between incentive constraints and private measurability illustrated in
Example 2 is relevant in comparing the corresponding core notions as well. For instance,
in Example 2, the mechanism where consumer 1’s net trade is given by z1(s) = (1,−1),
z1(t) = (−1,1) belongs to the ex ante incentive compatible core. However, this trade does
not satisfy the requirement of private measurability with respect to consumer 2’s informa-
tion.Theonlyprivatelymeasurablemechanismsareconstantmechanisms,andtheno-trade
mechanism is the only one in the private core.
It has been noted that private measurability of µ implies incentive compatibility (see,
for example, Allen, 1993; Koutsougeras and Yannelis, 1993; Vohra, 1999).20 Since the
18 Despite the terminology, these concepts should not be confused with the ﬁne core introduced in Wilson,
1978 which is an interim concept. A recent paper which deals with Wilson’s ﬁne core is Einy et al., 2000; see
Section 5.3.
19 Allen (1993) and Koutsougeras and Yannelis (1993)’s “coarse core” is based on the latter assumption. Again,
this notion should not be confused with the one introduced by Wilson (1978) (see Section 5).
20 These papers assume that each consumer has an endowment which can vary with his own type. In that case
private measurability of µ means that the corresponding net-trades depend only on i’s types, and the conclusion
of the following proposition should be read to say that the net-trades are constant with respect to the states.14 F. Forges et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 1–41
deﬁnitions of private measurability as well as incentive compatibility are not the same in
these papers, it is worthwhile to state a result explicitly in terms of our model and notation.





i ei for all t (exact feasibility), or,
(ii) all utility functions are strongly monotonic and there does not exist another privately
measurable mechanism µ  such that ui(t,µ (t)) ≥ ui(t,µ(t)) for all i and t with at
least one strict inequality.
Thenµisconstantwithrespecttothestates,i.e.µ(t) = µ(t )forallt,t  ∈ T.Inparticular,
µ is incentive compatible.
Theﬁrstpartofthispropositionshowsthatifµisprivatelymeasurableandsatisﬁesexact
feasibility, then µ is constant across states, and therefore incentive compatible. The second
part shows that in so far as efﬁcient allocations are concerned, this conclusions applies even
if free disposal is permitted.
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose (i) holds (exact feasibility). Let z denote the net-trades
corresponding to µ. By private measurability, for each i, zi depends only on ti. By exact
feasibility, zi(ti) =−
 
j =i zj(tj), from which it follows that zi(t) = zi(t ) for all i and




i zi(t) ≤ 0 for all t ∈ T. By Lemma 6.3 in Ichiishi and Radner
(1999), there exists a privately measurable mechanism µ  with associated net-trades z  such
that z 
i(t) ≥ zi(t) for all i and t ∈ T and
 
i z 
i(t) = 0 for all t ∈ T. Since µ does not
satisfy condition (i), strong monotonicity implies that ui(t,µ (t)) ≥ ui(t,µ(t)) for all i
and t with at least one strict inequality; a contradiction to (ii).
It should be emphasized that this result depends crucially on the exchange economy
model. In a different model, this connection between private measurability and incentive
compatibility may not hold.21
Finally, we check whether Proposition 1 still holds under other notions of private mea-
surability and/or of incentive compatibility. Consider a model in which each agent has an
information partition, Pi, deﬁned on a set of states Ω.F o rω ∈ Ω, let Pi(ω) denote the
element of Pi which contains ω. In this context, a state-contingent allocation x : Ω  → X
is said to satisfy private measurability, as in Allen (1993) and Koutsougeras and Yannelis
(1993),i f
xi(ω) = xi(ω )foralli, wheneverPi(ω) = Pi(ω ). (6)
As we have already mentioned, standard incentive compatibility requires extending the
domain of x to
 
i Pi, which can be identiﬁed with T. Suppose x satisﬁes (6) and exact
feasibility for each ω ∈ Ω. If we extend the domain of x to T by specifying x(t) = 0 for
21 For instance, Ichiishi and Idzik (1996) study ‘Bayesian societies’ in which agents use independent, measur-
able strategies (instead of mechanisms). They consider a case in which both private measurability and incentive
compatibility are imposed.F. Forges et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 1–41 15
all t ∈ T such that q(t) = 0, it can be shown, by the same argument used in the proof of
Proposition 1 (i), that x, so extended, is incentive compatible. But using free disposal in 0
probability states may be essential, as shown by the following example, which is similar to
Example 2 in Krasa and Shafer (2001).
Example3. Supposetherearetwoagentsandonecommodity.LetΩ ={ a,b},P1 = P2 =
({a},{b}) and e1 = e2 = 1. The utility functions are as follows:
u1(a,x) = x, u1(b,x) = 2x, u2(a,x) = 2x, u2(b,x) = x.
Consider the allocation x:
x(a) = (0,2), x(b) = (2,0).
This allocation does satisfy the present notion of private measurability, (6), because both
agents know the true state. Let Ti ={ ai,b i} be the set of types for each i, so that (a1,a 2)
refers to state a and (b1,b 2) refers to state b.F o rx  deﬁned on T and agreeing with x on
(a1,a 2)and(b1,b 2),incentivecompatibilityrequiresthatx 
1(b1,a 2) ≤ 0andx 
2(b1,a 2) ≤
0. Thus, x 
1(b1,a 2) + x 
2(b1,a 2)<e 1 + e2.
While Proposition 1 (i) applies to exactly feasible allocations satisfying (6) (by allocat-
ing 0 in 0 probability states), Proposition 1 (ii) cannot be similarly extended; the Ichiishi
and Radner (1999) argument does rely on measurability with respect to types. Indeed, an
allocation which satisﬁes (6) but not exact feasibility in all positive probability states may
not be extendable to an incentive compatible allocation, as the next example shows. Of
course, this weakens signiﬁcantly the rationale for imposing (6) on the basis of incentive
compatibility.
Example 4. As in the previous example, there are two consumers, one commodity and
e1 = e2 = 1. Let Ω ={ a,b,c}, P1 = ({a,b},{c}) and P2 = ({a,c},{b}). Each of the
three states is equally likely. The utility functions are ui(ω,x) = x for i = 1,2, ω ∈ Ω.
Consider the following allocation, satisfying (6) but not exact feasibility:
x(a) = (0,0), x(b) = (0,2), x(c) = (2,0).
Deﬁne the types as T1 ={ s1,t 1} and T2 ={ s2,t 2} so that (s1,s 2) refers to a, (s1,t 2) to b,
(t1,s 2) to c, and (t1,t 2) is an incompatible report. Suppose x  is an extension of x to T.F o r
x  to be measurable with respect to types, x (t1,t 2) = (2,2), which is infeasible, and so
Proposition 1 (ii) cannot be applied. In fact, there is no way to make x  feasible as well as
incentive compatible; even if x (t1,t 2) = (0,0), agent 1 gains by reporting t1 when he is of
type s1, and agent 2 gains by reporting t2 when he is of type s2.
KoutsougerasandYannelis(1993)alsoidentifyassumptionsunderwhichprivatemeasur-
abilityimpliesincentivecompatibility(seeProposition4.1andTheorem4.1inKoutsougeras
and Yannelis, 1993). Private measurability in Koutsougeras and Yannelis, 1993 refers to
((6))butmoreimportantly,theyintroducedeﬁnitionsofcoalitionalBayesianincentivecom-
patibility (Deﬁnitions 4.1 and 4.2), which, applied to individual agents, do not correspond16 F. Forges et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 1–41
to the standard concept of Bayesian incentive compatibility, as stated in condition (2).22
For instance, consider in Example 4, the following allocation:
y(a) = (0,0), y(b) = (1,1), y(c) = (1,1).
According to Deﬁnitions 4.1 or 4.2 in Koutsougeras and Yannelis (1993), this allocation is
not incentive compatible, because agent 1 can ‘gain’ by pretending that the state is c when
it is a. Notice though, that agent 1’s partition does not allow him to recognize the difference
between states a and b. If the state is actually b, his declaration that the state is c would
be incompatible with agent 2’s truthful report. As mentioned above, the standard notion of
incentive compatibility makes it necessary to deﬁne outcomes for all possible declarations
of types. For example, if we extend y to y  over T where y (t1,t 2) = (0,0), y  is incentive
compatible according to condition (2).
4.2. Emptiness of the ex ante incentive compatible core
The question of the non-emptiness of the ex ante incentive compatible core in exchange
economies has been recently settled negatively by Vohra (1999) and Forges et al. (2002).
Thesecondpaperprovidesanexampleofawell-behavedeconomywithquasi-linearutility
functions in which the ex ante incentive compatible core is empty, and this even if the grand
coalition can enlarge its feasible set by relying on random mechanisms. By contrast, in
Vohra (1999), the agents cannot make monetary transfers nor use lotteries. In the example
constructed in Vohra (1999), the latter restriction is not innocuous: Forges and Minelli
(2001) show that if random mechanisms are allowed in this economy, the corresponding
ex ante incentive compatible core is non-empty (we shall return to this in Section 4.3.2).
The negative result in Forges et al. (2002) is thus stronger than the one in Vohra (1999).
Furthermore, the computations are simpler in Forges et al. (2002): given the transferable
utility setting, it sufﬁces to show that the game is not balanced. We brieﬂy describe the
example.
Example 5. The economy involves three agents and four goods (three consumption goods
and money); agent 1 has two equiprobable types s and t, while agents 2 and 3 do not have
private information (T1 ={ s,t}, q(s) = q(t) = (1/2), T2 and T3 are singletons).
Let the endowments in consumption goods be
e1 = (1,0,0), e2 = (0,2,0), e3 = (0,0,2).
Denote the consumption bundle as x = (x1,x2,x3) and the monetary transfer as m; let the
(quasi-linear) utility functions be
ui(r,x,m)= wi(r,x) + mi = 1,2,3,r = s,t,
22 The deﬁnition of coalitional Bayesian incentive compatibility in Koutsougeras and Yannelis (1993) is in terms
of ex post utility. Allen and Yannelis (2001) use a notion of coalitional Bayesian incentive compatibility which is
similar in spirit to Koutsougeras and Yannelis (1993) but is expressed in terms of interim expected utility (see the
discussion in Hahn and Yannelis, 1997).F. Forges et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 1–41 17
where
w1(s,x) = 2x1 + min{(x2 + x3),2},
w2(s,x) = w3(s,x) = 3x1 + 2min{x2,x3},
w1(t,x) = x1 + h(x2) + h(x3),
w2(t,x) = w3(t,x) = x2 + x3,
and
h(x) = min{0.9x,0.05x + 0.85}.
Letusﬁrstconsidermechanismswhichallowunlimitedmonetarytransfersmi(s),mi(t),
i = 1,2,3 satisfying the feasibility constraints
 
i mi(r) ≤ 0,r= s,t. It is easily checked
thattheexanteincentivecompatiblecoreofthiseconomyisjustthecoreofaTUcharacter-
isticfunctiongamev∗ (seeForgesetal.,2002fordetails).Asabenchmark,wealsoconsider
the TU characteristic function v associated with the economy in the absence of incentive
constraints.Obviously, v∗ ≤ v. We know that the core of v is not empty or, equivalently, by
the Bondareva-Shapley theorem (see, e.g. Myerson, 1991), that v is balanced.
In the present example, v is in fact exactly balanced, in the sense that
v(N) = 1
2[v({1,2}) + v({1,3}) + v({2,3})]. (7)
Toseethis,noticethatefﬁciencyincoalition{2,3}isachievedbyhavingeachagentconsume
the same amount of each of the commodities 2 and 3 in each state. The corresponding
aggregate utility is 4 in each state, and v({2,3}) = 4. In coalition {1,2} or {1,3}, efﬁciency
is achieved by having the agents swap their endowments in state s and no-trade in state t.
This results in aggregate utility of 5 and 3 in states s and t respectively, and transfers (for
example, of equal amounts in the two states) can then be made to distribute ex ante utility
acrosstheagentsinanyway,i.e.v({1,2}) = v({1,3}) = 4.Inthegrandcoalitionefﬁciency
requires that in state s commodity 1 is given to agents 2 and 3 and agent 1 receives equal
amounts of commodities 2 and 3, say b, where b ≤ 1, and there is no trade in state t. The
resulting aggregate utility is 7 in state s and 5 in state t. Again, transfers can be used to
redistribute ex ante utility across the agents, and we have v(N) = 6 which implies (7).
A second important property of our example is that, in subcoalitions, the incentive con-
ditions do not entail any loss of efﬁciency, i.e.
v∗(S) = v(S) ∀S : |S|=2 (8)
This is obvious for coalition {2,3}, which does not face any incentive compatibility con-
straint. Notice that the efﬁcient mechanism we identiﬁed for coalition {1,2} is incen-
tive compatible (without transfers) because w1(s,(0,2,0)) = w1(s,(1,0,0)) = 2 and
w1(t,(1,0,0)) = 1 while w1(t,(0,2,0)) = h(1)<1. And by making identical transfers
in each state it is possible to satisfy incentive compatibility and achieve v({1,2}). Clearly,
the same argument applies to {1,3}.
By the Bondareva-Shapley theorem, the ex ante incentive compatible core is non-empty
if and only if v∗ is balanced, which, by (7) and (8) implies that v∗(N) = v(N). To complete
theproofofourassertionthattheexanteincentivecompatiblecoreisemptyinthisexample,18 F. Forges et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 1–41
therefore, it only remains to be shown that v∗(N) < v(N). Suppose not. Then there must
exist a ﬁrst best efﬁcient mechanism µ, with a corresponding allocation of goods, x, and
transfers,m,whichisincentivecompatible.Aswehavealreadyobserved,efﬁciencyrequires
that x1(s) = (0,b,b),0≤ b ≤ 1 and x1(t) = (1,0,0). Incentive compatibility requires
that
w1(s,(0,b,b))+ m1(s) ≥ w1(s,(1,0,0)) + m1(t),
w1(t,(1,0,0)) + m1(t) ≥ w1(t,(0,b,b))+ m1(s).
This implies (by summing the two inequalities) that
w1(s,(0,b,b))+ w1(t,(1,0,0)) ≥ w1(s,(1,0,0)) + w1(t,(0,b,b)), (9)
or, 1 + 2b ≥ 2 + 2h(b), which obviously is not true (since h(b) = 0.9b for b ≤ 1).
In Forges et al. (2002), it is proved that all the previous arguments go through when
random mechanisms are allowed, and that the counter-example is fully robust with respect
to the probability on states, the endowments, and the utility functions. In particular, the
example can be modiﬁed so as to make the economy even more well-behaved. Forges et al.
(2002) also uses the previous counter-example to demonstrate the emptiness of the core
in a Walrasian economy, in which the agents are endowed with some limited amount of
money.
4.3. Sufﬁcient conditions for non-emptiness
4.3.1. Cases in which the incentives problem disappears
Theliteratureonimplementationandmechanismdesignhasidentiﬁedassumptionsunder
which the incentives problem can be eliminated in the sense that for any reasonable (in
particular, ﬁrst-best) mechanism, an equivalent, incentive compatible mechanism can be
constructed. This approach can be fruitfully applied to the problem at hand, since in the
absence of incentive constraints, the ex ante core of the basic economy is non-empty.
Consider ﬁrst the case of complete information, i.e. for all t ∈ T such that q(t) >
0, q(t|ti) = 1. Clearly, in this case, any inconsistency in the agents’ declarations can be
detected.Bystipulatingthatnogoodsareallocatedincaseofaninconsistency,itispossible
tomakeanymechanism,inparticularanyallocationintheexantecoreofthebasiceconomy,
equivalent to one which is incentive compatible.
A less trivial information structure with a similar feature is that of non-exclusive infor-
mation, introduced by Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986), under which the true state can
be identiﬁed even if the type of any one individual is not known.
Information is said to be non-exclusive if
∀t ∈ T : q(t) > 0, ∀i ∈ N, q(ti|t−i) = 1.
The next proposition is established in Vohra (1999).
Proposition 2. If information is non-exclusive, the ex ante incentive compatible core is
non-empty.F. Forges et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 1–41 19
As in the case of complete information, any unilateral lie gives rise to a reported state of
null probability. If we modify any mechanism by requiring that it allocates no good at such
states, expected utilities do not change but misreport of information is punished, so that the
new mechanism is incentive compatible.23
Non-exclusivityofinformationcanbeinterpretedasanotionofinformationalsmallness.
McLeanandPostlewaite(1999)introduceamorereﬁnedconcept.Theyparameterizeinfor-
mation structures of pure common value economies (to be deﬁned presently) by a measure
that takes into account the relationship between the informational size of each individual,
the level of aggregate uncertainty, and the extent to which individual signals inﬂuence the
posteriordistributiononthestate;seeMcLeanandPostlewaite(1999)fordetails.Thisleads
to a precise measure of informational smallness under which it is possible to approximate
almost any allocation of the underlying complete information economy by an incentive
compatible mechanism. They use this characterization in McLean and Postlewaite (2000)
to prove that the ex ante incentive compatible core is non-empty whenever individuals are
informationally small in this sense. Their notion encompasses non-exclusive information,
but also more general information structures.
AnotherspecialcaseoftheMcLean–Postlewaitemodel,analyzedindependentlybyKrasa
and Shafer (2001), is one in which information is, in some well deﬁned sense, ‘almost
complete’. Consider a situation of pure common values, in which the utility of individuals
depends only on the realization of a state of nature θ in some ﬁnite set Θ: vi(θ,x). The
elements of the set Ti can be viewed as signals, which do not enter the utility function
directly.24 For simplicity, let us set Ti = Θ, and let q ∈  (Θn+1) indicate the joint
probability distribution on the state of nature and the signals. Each individual is informed
ontherealizationofhisownsignalandcaresaboutthesignalsreceivedbyotheragentsonly
ifthesesignalscontainsomeinformationconcerningtherealizationofθ.Ifq isconcentrated
on the diagonal, d,o fΘn+1, q(d(Θn+1)) = 1, we are back to complete information: all
individuals are perfectly informed about the realization of the state of nature. A situation
of ‘almost complete information’ is captured by considering a sequence of pure common
values economies (Ek)k≥1 indexed by prior probabilities qk ∈  (Θn+1) converging to
full information, qk → q with q(d(Θn+1)) = 1. Intuitively, when the economy is close to
completeinformationweexpecttobeabletousesimplepunishmentmechanisms,likethose
discussed for the case of complete and of non-exclusive information, to facilitate incentive
compatibility.
23 Observe that in the case of non-exclusive information, lies can be detected but not liars; hence all agents are
punished in case of a misreport. As in Example 3, the punishment must be hard (all goods are conﬁscated) because
the mechanisms in the ex ante core are not necessarily interim individually rational. Of course, in a two-agent
economy, as in Example 3, non-exclusive information means complete information. If there are at least three
agents, in the case of complete information it is possible to make the mechanism non-wasteful; see Krasa and
Shafer (2001). However, if information is non-exclusive this is generally not possible even when there are at least
three agents; see Example 6. Additional complications arise when endowments are allowed to be type-dependent.
Indeed,fortheclassofmechanismsproposedinForgesetal.(2002)(seealsothediscussionbeforeProposition4),
the simple argument given in the text does not work.
24 Notice that introducing the parameter θ in the model of Section 2 does not make it more general, since we can
always deﬁne ui(t,x) =
 
θ vi(θ,t,x)q(θ|t). Here, in the special case of common values, it is useful to keep
track of θ explicitly.20 F. Forges et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 1–41
The McLean and Postlewaite (2000) result makes use of the notion of the strict core of
an economy, i.e. the set of core allocations such that, in every subcoalition, all members
have a strictly higher utility than what they could get by deviating.25
Proposition 3. Let E be a pure common value economy such that the strict core of the
underlying Arrow–Debreu economy is non-empty. If all agents are informationally small,
then the ex ante incentive compatible core of E is non-empty.
The idea that correlation of beliefs facilitates the fulﬁllment of incentive compatibility
conditions has also been used in the model of Section 2, under the additional assumption
that utility functions ui(t,·) are quasi-linear, i.e.
ui(t,x,m)= wi(t,x) + m ∀i ∈ N, t ∈ T, x ∈ Rl
+,m∈ R.
In this setting, it is understood that arbitrary monetary transfers are allowed. Feasibility
requires the sum of transfers to be non-positive. The mechanism design literature (for ex-
ample,Arrow,1979;d’AspremontandGérard-Varet,1979,1982;GreenandLaffont,1979;
Groves, 1973; Johnson et al., 1990) identiﬁes conditions (on the beliefs and/or the utility
functions)underwhichitispossibletoconstructmoneytransferschemesmaking(typically,
ﬁrst best) allocations incentive compatible. In our model, as shown in Forges et al. (2002),
this implies that the incentive constraints do not affect the grand coalition, i.e. v∗(N) =
v(N). From this, one deduces immediately that the ex ante incentive compatible core is
non-empty, since it is so even if subcoalitions can object with non-incentive compatible
mechanisms.
More precisely, consider the following conditions on the beliefs q: even if agents get
utility only from the monetary transfers (i.e. the utility functions wi are identically 0), there
exists a strictly incentive compatible and exactly feasible money transfer scheme. This is
called Condition B in d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979, 1982) (see also Johnson et al.,
1990). It can be interpreted as a form of correlation between the agents’ beliefs. Under B,
the ex ante incentive compatible core is non-empty; see Forges et al. (2002). d’Aspremont
et al. (1990) show that this condition is generic provided that n ≥ 3 and no player is fully
informed.26
d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979, 1982) weaken the previous condition to one they
refer to as Condition C, which is always satisﬁed by independent beliefs. They further
assume that values are private, i.e.
wi(t,x) = wi(ti,x) ∀i ∈ N, t ∈ T, x ∈ Rl
+.
With private values, ﬁrst best efﬁcient allocations can be implemented via Groves mech-
anisms, and correlation is not needed to elicit private information. As shown in Forges et al.
25 See McLean and Postlewaite (2000) for conditions ensuring the non-emptiness of the strict core of complete
information economies. Note also that they refer to the underlying Arrow–Debreu economy with contingent
commodities (without incentive constraints) as the auxiliary economy.
26 In view of the counter-example of Section 4.2, notice that the latter proposition typically relies on unlimited
monetary transfers (see Forges et al., 2002 for further comments on the robustness of the counter-example in
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(2002),ConditionCisthensufﬁcientforthenon-emptinessoftheexanteincentivecompat-
ible core. Example 5 shows that the assumption of private values cannot be dropped in this
statement. One can also deduce from d’Aspremont et al. (1990) that the ex ante incentive
compatible core is non-empty if values are private and |Ti|≤2 for every i ∈ N.
Forges et al. (2002) further show that quasi-linearity is specially useful if the basic
model of Section 2 is extended so as to allow for type-dependent initial endowments.
Assume that each agent i of type ti initially owns a bundle ei(ti) (since agents know their
initial endowments, these are privately measurable). In that case, it is natural to consider
more general mechanisms than before, which ask every agent to show a bundle that is
consistent with his reported type (see, e.g. Hurwicz et al., 1995). This considerably restricts
the possibilities of lying: an agent can only pretend to be of a poorer type than he really
is. In Forges et al. (2002) it is established that if the initial endowments are a one-to-one
function of types (a condition which holds generically), feasible monetary transfers can be
constructed so as to make the ﬁrst best incentive compatible. Hence, as above, the ex ante
incentive compatible core is non-empty.
Proposition 4. Suppose each agent has a quasi linear utility function and endowments
which are a one-to-one function of his types. Then the ex ante incentive compatible core is
non-empty.
4.3.2. Scarf’s theorem and random mechanisms
We now turn to particular cases where, although incentives do matter, the ex ante in-
centive compatible core is non-empty. Two agents or linear utility functions are immediate
examples27 (seeIchiishiandIdzik,1996;Vohra,1999).Anotherclassofexampleshasbeen
identiﬁed in Forges and Minelli (2001). In order to get a positive result, they need to allow
for random mechanisms.
In Holmström and Myerson (1983), the economy involves a set of feasible decisions
(in our notation, X), but decision rules (i.e. mechanisms) are deﬁned as mappings from
the set of types T to the set of probability distributions over X. Random mechanisms are
indeed necessary as soon as the revelation principle is applied in full generality and covers
in particular the case where agents can use mixed strategies. Even if, as in our framework,
thesetX isconvexandtheutilityfunctionsui(t,·)areconcave,allowingforrandommech-
anisms can make a great difference, because of the incentive compatibility constraints. For
instance,asalreadyobservedbyPrescottandTownsend(1984a,b),aconvexcombinationof
deterministic incentive compatible feasible mechanisms need not be incentive compatible,
so that the sets V ∗(S) which deﬁne the characteristic function corresponding to the ex ante
incentive compatible core need not be convex either.
Let S be a coalition. Recall that XS is the set of feasible commodity vectors for coalition
S,ateverystate(see(5)).Let (XS)bethesetofallprobabilitydistributionsoverthe(Borel
subsetsof)XS.AfeasiblerandommechanismforcoalitionS isatransitionprobabilityfrom
TS to XS, namely a mapping µS : T →  (XS) such that
µS(·|t)= µS(·|t ) ∀t,t  ∈ T : tS = t 
S
27 BuildingonRosenmueller’smodeloffeegames,Rosenmueller(1999),Haake(2001)alsoidentiﬁedparticular
economies in which the ex ante incentive compatible core is not empty.22 F. Forges et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 1–41
whereµS(·|t)denotestheimageoft byµS.Feasibilityrequiresthateveryallocationselected
bythemechanismbeinXS.Allen(1992,1994)andPrescottandTownsend(1984a,b)argue
that in large economies, one may be satisﬁed with a weaker notion, expected feasibility (see












ei ∀t ∈ T.
This property only depends of the marginal distributions of the mechanism over every
agent’s allocation.
The extension of the deﬁnitions of Section 2 (expected utility, Bayesian incentive com-








ui(ti,t −i,x i)µS(dxi|si,t −i).
Similarly, all the notions introduced in Section 4.1, and in particular the ex ante incentive
compatible core itself, apply to random mechanisms. The “modiﬁed (ex ante) incentive
compatible core” of Allen (1992, 1994) is deﬁned in a similar way by allowing coalitions
to use expected feasible mechanisms. As shown in Allen (1992), it is always non-empty, as
a consequence of Scarf (1967)’s theorem.
Proposition 5. The “modiﬁed (ex ante) incentive compatible core”, in which coalitions use
expected feasible incentive compatible random mechanisms, is non-empty.
To establish the previous result, let S be a balanced family of coalitions, with balancing
weights λS,S∈ S:
 
S i λS = 1 for every i ∈ N (it is understood that λS = 0 for S/ ∈ S).
Let V ∗
e,r be the characteristic function deﬁned as V ∗, but allowing for expected feasible
random mechanisms. The underlying game is balanced if
 
S∈S V ∗





e,r(S). For every coalition S ∈ S, there exists an expected feasible
incentive compatible mechanism µS such that vi ≤ Ui(µS) ∀i ∈ S. In order to show that
the game is balanced, one must construct, from the mechanisms µS, an expected feasible
incentivecompatiblefeasiblemechanismµN forthegrandcoalitionsuchthatvi ≤ Ui(µN)
∀i ∈ N.
We will use (λS)S i as a lottery over the coalitions containing agent i. Let, for every S,




λSµS,i(·|t) ∀i ∈ N, t ∈ T (10)
and let µN be the product probability distribution constructed from µN,i,i ∈ N. µN is
expectedfeasibleandincentivecompatiblebecauseboththeexpectedfeasibilityconstraints
and the incentive constraints only depend on the marginal distributions of the mechanism.
Furthermore, by the linearity of Ui, vi ≤ Ui(µN).
28 The notion of feasibility in Prescott and Townsend (1984a,b) is even weaker than in this section; there, the
average is taken over types as well.F. Forges et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 1–41 23
In the absence of assumptions on the size of the economy, expected feasibility is not
relevant, and one would like to apply Scarf’s result to exactly feasible mechanisms. Even if,
in the above proof, the mechanisms µS are exactly feasible, the mechanism µN constructed
from (10) may not be. The difﬁculty typically comes from the fact that the agents are
allocated goods independently of each other. It is thus natural to look for a mechanism µN
whose marginal distributions µN,i satisfy (10), which is a key to incentive compatibility,
but is not necessarily a product-mechanism. Unfortunately, it is possible that no mechanism
with marginals as in (10) is feasible.
Let us go back to Example 5 and consider the balanced family S ={ { 1,2},{1,3},{2,3}}
with the weights (1/2)(n = 3). Let xS,i denote the state s allocations of the goods to agent
i in coalition S ∈ S corresponding to the deterministic, ﬁrst best efﬁcient mechanism of S
as identiﬁed in Example 5. Recall that
x{1,2},1 = (0,2,0), x{1,2},2 = (1,0,0),
x{1,3},1 = (0,0,2), x{1,3},3 = (1,0,0),
x{2,3},2 = (0,1,1), x{2,3},3 = (0,1,1).
Let µN be a feasible mechanism satisfying (10). In state s, µN(·|s)must allocate either (0,
2, 0) or (0, 0, 2), with the same probability, to agent 1. And it must allocate either (1, 0, 0)
or (0, 1, 1), with the same probability, to agent 2. But if µN(·|s) satisﬁes this property for
agent 1, feasibility precludes it from also having in its support the allocation of (0, 1, 1) to
agent 2.
Forges and Minelli (2001) identify a class of economies where the construction of a
feasible mechanism satisfying (10) is possible.
Proposition 6. Assume that if agent i initially owns a positive quantity of some good, then
no other agent initially owns this good (for every k, if ek
i > 0, then ek
j = 0 for every j  ≡ i)





i(t,xk) ∀i ∈ N, t ∈ T, x ∈ Rl
+.
Then the ex ante incentive compatible core associated with random mechanisms is non-
empty.
The crucial assumption is that the utility function must be separable across goods. The
assumptiononendowmentswouldhavenobiteifwedidnotrequireseparability;onecould
always rename goods so as to satisfy it.
The main idea of the proof is to consider the marginal distributions that the mechanisms
induce over goods, rather than over agents. The separability across goods makes it possible
to allocate goods independently of each other. Eq. (10) can be deduced from the properties
of balancing weights.
Forges and Minelli (2001) show that their proof can be modiﬁed so as to deal with
economies that do not fully satisfy the above assumptions, like Vohra (1999)’s example,
in which some agents have a non-separable utility function in one state. Recall that in this
example, the ex ante incentive compatible core associated with deterministic mechanisms24 F. Forges et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 1–41
is empty. Hence, there are environments where random mechanisms are crucial for the
non-emptiness of the ex ante incentive compatible core.
However, in Example 5, the ex ante incentive compatible core associated with random
mechanisms is empty. This shows that the assumptions in the above proposition cannot be
dropped. The same applies to the non-separability of the utility functions in Example 5.
5. The interim stage
At the ex ante stage there is no ambiguity about how a mechanism should be evaluated
from the point of view of a particular agent (whether the evaluation is done by the agent or
by an outsider)—expected utility provides the correct measure. (Whether or not incentive
compatibility should be imposed is a separate issue.) In contrast, at the interim stage, ac-
count must clearly be taken of the fact that agents already possess their private information
whentheyengageincoalitionalnegotiations.Fromthepointofviewofanagent,theappro-
priate utility measure is then conditional expected utility, conditional on the agent’s type.
Anoutsiderevaluatingamechanismfromthepointofviewofanagentshouldnowconsider
the conditional expected utility of the agent for each of her types. Recall that this is the rea-
son that the notion of an interim Pareto improvement as in Holmström and Myerson (1983)
requiresallagentsofalltypestogain.Andthisapproachsuggeststhatanotionofthecoreat








developed in Wilson (1978), which we shall formally deﬁne in the next section. In order to
clarifytheissuesinvolved,incentivecompatibilitywillnotbeincorporateduntilSection5.2.
5.1. The coarse core
Wilson (1978) provided a seminal analysis of the core at the interim stage (without
imposing incentive constraints). He introduced two notions of the (interim) core: the coarse
core and ﬁne core. The former relates to the case in which the information possessed by
agents cannot be pooled, and the latter to the case in which information can be shared in an
arbitrary manner. We defer a discussion of the ﬁne core until Section 5.3. In both cases, the
factthatincentiveconstraintsareignoredcanbetakentoimplythatallinformationbecomes
publiclyknownatthe(expost)stagewhenactualtradesaremade.WhileWilsonformulates
incompleteness of information by specifying partitions over a state space, we shall rely on
the basic model of Section 2 in which private information is described by agents types.
What follows is simply a re-formulation of Wilson’s concept in the types framework.
29 This is the approach followed in Ichiishi and Idzik (1996).F. Forges et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 1–41 25
A key idea in deﬁning the coarse core is the notion of a common knowledge event.30 For
aneventE ⊆ T letEi denotethecorrespondingsetoftypesforagenti,i.e.Ei ={ ti|t ∈ E}.
An event E ⊆ T is said to be common knowledge for S if
q(t 
−i|ti) = 0 foralli ∈ S,ti ∈ Ei and (t 
−i,t i)/ ∈ E.
Based on the fact that all agents within a coalition can discern a common knowledge
event, a coarse objection can be directed at any such event. An objection over event E
requires all types in Ei to gain in interim utility. More precisely, let µ ∈ F be a feasible
mechanism. Coalition S has a coarse objection to µ if there exists an event E which is
common knowledge for S and a mechanism νS ∈ FS
31 such that
Ui(νS|ti)>U i(µ|ti) ∀i ∈ S, ∀ti ∈ Ei.
(Notethatwiththisnotionofdominance,thereisnolossofgeneralityinrestrictingattention





The coarse core is the set of all feasible mechanisms to which no coalition has a coarse
objection.
Observe that in identifying a coarse objection it is enough for the objecting coalition to
be able to improve upon the status-quo over a common knowledge event. For the grand
coalition, this turns out to be (essentially) equivalent to the requirement that the new allo-
cation dominate the status-quo for all consumers of all types, as in the notion of interim
efﬁciency.(Theonlyreasonthisisnotexactlysoisthatwehavedeﬁneddominanceinterms
of strict inequalities, while in Holmström and Myerson, 1983 dominance is deﬁned with
weak inequalities and some strict inequality.) For if the grand coalition has a dominating
mechanism over a common knowledge event E it can consider the same mechanism over
E and the status-quo over the complement of E which ensures that no type of any agent
loses and some types (those in E) gain strictly. It is worthwhile to stress that this argument
does not necessarily apply to a coalition which is a strict subset of the grand coalition be-
cause such a coalition may have an objection over a common knowledge event but may not
be able to assure itself of the status-quo utility over states not in E. This is most simply
seen by considering an objection from a singleton coalition (recall the discussion of interim
individual rationality in Section 1.2.1). For coalition {i}, the event {t ∈ T|ti = t 
i} is a
common knowledge event, and i has a coarse objection if there is some ti ∈ Ti over which i
can do better with his own endowment.32 For this reason, the logical inclusion relationship
between the set of ex ante efﬁcient mechanism and interim efﬁcient mechanisms does not
extend to the ex ante core and the coarse core; the ex ante core is not necessarily a subset of
30 The deﬁnitions appearing in Holmström and Myerson (1983) and Vohra (1999)are inaccurate, as pointed out
to us by Claus–Jochen Haake, but the results in those papers hold for common knowledge as deﬁned here (which
corresponds to the deﬁnition in Chapter 10 in Myerson, 1991).
31 As pointed out in Section 4.1, in the absence of incentive constraints it is appropriate to consider FS rather
than Fm
S as the set of feasible mechanisms for S. If coalition S is restricted to Fm
S the main result of this section
remains unchanged since the core would then be larger than the one we will deﬁne presently.
32 Notice that in Example 1, the mechanism where z1(s) = z1(t) = (−1,0.6) is ex ante individual rationality for
consumer 1 but is not not interim individually rational because agent 1 in state t (knowing the state at the interim
stage) is better-off not trading.26 F. Forges et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 1–41
the coarse core.33 And the non-emptiness of the coarse core cannot, therefore, be inferred
simply from that of the ex ante core.
Wilson (1978) proved that, under standard assumptions (continuity and concavity of
ui(ti,·) for all i and ti, as imposed in Section 2), the coarse core is non-empty. His argu-
mentproceedsbyconstructinganappropriateNTUgameasfollows.Foreachagent i inthe
economy deﬁne a player corresponding to each of i’s types and consider an NTU game in
which a typical player is denoted (i,ti); there are
 
i |Ti| players in this game. The utility
function of player (i,ti) is Ui(·|ti). The ‘grand coalition’ is (N,T) and other allowable
coalitions are restricted to be of the form (S,E) ={ (i,ti)|i ∈ S,ti ∈ Ei}, where S ⊆ N
and E is a common knowledge event for S. The feasible utility set for coalition S is derived
by applying the utility functions Ui(·|ti) to the set of feasible allocations (deterministic
mechanisms) from T to XS. Note that mechanisms are deterministic and are not required
to be incentive compatible. It can then be shown by a standard argument that for any bal-
ancedcollectionofcoalitionsandcorrespondingdeterministicmechanisms,themechanism
constructed as in (10) is feasible for the grand coalition. The NTU game is, therefore, bal-
anced and by Scarf (1967)’s theorem it has a non-empty core. The corresponding set of
mechanisms is precisely the coarse core of the underlying economy.
Proposition 7. The coarse core is non-empty.
Wilson also pointed out (footnote 6 in Wilson, 1978) that, alternatively, non-emptiness
of the coarse core follows from the observation that it contains equilibrium allocations of a
constrained market process which we formally deﬁne in Section 6.2; see also Theorem 5.7
in Goenka and Shell (1997).
5.2. The incentive compatible coarse core
At this stage it should be clear how to incorporate incentive compatibility in the coarse
core. The only change that needs to be made to the deﬁnition in the previous section
is to require that the relevant mechanism satisfy incentive compatibility (as well as the
measurability conditions (4)). This leads to the notion of the incentive compatible coarse
core studied in Vohra (1999).
Foranincentivecompatibleandfeasiblemechanismµ ∈ F∗,coalitionS hasanincentive
compatible coarse objection if there exists an event E which is common knowledge for S
and a mechanism νS ∈ F∗
S such that
Ui(νS|ti)>U i(µ|ti) ∀i ∈ S, ∀ti ∈ Ei.
The incentive compatible coarse core consists of all incentive compatible and feasible
mechanisms to which no coalition has an incentive compatible coarse objection.
In this case, an objection from the grand coalition corresponds to domination in the
sense of interim incentive efﬁciency. While the argument is no longer as simple as the one
concerning the coarse core and interim efﬁciency, it follows from Theorem 1 in Holmström
33 If objections at the interim stage are required to make all types better-off, as in Ichiishi and Idzik (1996), then
such an inclusion does indeed hold.F. Forges et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 1–41 27
andMyerson(1983).Thus,theincentivecompatiblecoarsecorebearsthesamerelationship
to interim incentive efﬁciency as the coarse core does to interim efﬁciency.
Notice that in a two-agent economy, the incentive compatible coarse core is the set of
interim individually rational and interim incentive efﬁcient allocations.34 Under the usual
assumptions therefore, this set is non-empty.
As in Proposition 2, and by a similar argument (Proposition 3.1 in Vohra, 1999), non-
emptiness holds if information is non-exclusive. Moreover, in this case, the mechanism
used to ensure incentive compatibility can be chosen to be non-wasteful.
Proposition 8. If information is non-exclusive, the incentive compatible coarse core is
non-empty.
Unfortunately, the positive result of Wilson, Proposition 7, does not extend to the case in
which incentive constraints are imposed. An example of a three-consumer economy with
an empty incentive compatible coarse core was provided in Vohra (1999). A much stronger
negative result was established in Forges et al. (2002) pertaining to a quasi linear economy.
In fact, Example 5 is one in which the incentive compatible coarse core is empty even if
random mechanisms are allowed; see Forges et al. (2002) for details.
The results we have described so far for the coarse core are analogous to some of those
on the ex ante core discussed in Section 4. It is natural then, to ask whether non-emptiness
of the incentive compatible coarse core can be established under the other conditions dis-
cussed in Section 4.3.1. In particular, whether the notion of informational smallness of
McLean and Postlewaite or the conditions in d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979, 1982)
sufﬁce to obtain a positive result for the incentive compatible coarse core. Unfortunately,
the mechanism design approach of Section 4.3.1, which was so fruitful in the ex ante case,
does not immediately extend to the interim case. While monetary transfers make it possible
totransferexanteutilityacrossconsumerswithoutaffectingincentiveconstraints,thesame
neednotbetrueintermsoftransfersofinterimutility(acrosstypes).Indeed,oneingredient
of the approach in Section 4.3.1 was to construct, corresponding to a ﬁrst-best outcome, a
transfer scheme satisfying incentive compatibility. And an appropriate transfer scheme will
typically affect interim utilities. Restrictions on interim utility (such as interim individual
rationality) may be too demanding if one insists on ﬁrst-best efﬁciency even in the case
of independent, private values (Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983).35 While that approach
may not longer be fruitful, the possibility remains that the incentive compatible coarse core
is non-empty under the conditions of Propositions 3, 4 and 6. These are important open
questions for future work in this area.
5.3. Information sharing
The coarse core is based on the assumption that a coalition can coordinate a potential
objectiononlyoveraneventwhichiscommonknowledgetomembersofthecoalition.While
34 In Example 1, the only mechanism in the incentive compatible coarse core is no-trade.
35 While the Myerson-Satterthwaite result relies on a continuum of types, the same problem can arise with a
ﬁnite number of types, as in Table 5.2 in Milgrom and Roberts (1992).28 F. Forges et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 1–41
there is no doubt that a coalition must be permitted to direct an objection over a common
knowledge event, it is worth considering alternative notions of the core (reﬁnements of the
coarse core) which allow a coalition to do more. In the extreme, suppose a coalition can
choose any informational event which can be discerned by pooling the private information
of its members. The corresponding notion of the core is the ﬁne core of Wilson (1978),
which we now describe in terms of our basic model.
Deﬁne an admissible event for coalition S to be an event of the form E =
 
i∈S Ei ×  
j/ ∈S Tj, where Ei ⊆ Ti for all i ∈ S and q(E) > 0. A coalition may now rely on an
admissible event to construct an objection. Let q(t|E,ti) denote the updated conditional
probability of an agent whose type is ti ∈ Ei and who believes that the true state lies in
E; set to 0 the probability of any state not in E and apply Bayes’ rule. For an allocation x
deﬁne Ui(x|E,ti) as the corresponding updated conditional expected utility. Note that if E
is a common knowledge event, then Ui(x|E,ti) = Ui(x|ti).
Coalition S is said to have a ﬁne objection to µ ∈ F if there exists an admissible event E
for S and a mechanism νS ∈ FS such that
Ui(νS|E,ti)>U i(µ|E,ti) ∀i ∈ S, ∀ti ∈ Ei.
Theﬁnecoreconsistsofallfeasiblemechanismstowhichnocoalitionhasaﬁneobjection.
Clearly,theﬁnecoreiscontainedinthecoarsecore.Thefollowingexampleillustratesthe
differences, and shows that the ﬁne core may be empty. This example is similar to Example
2i nWilson (1978) except that it involves constant endowments, in keeping with our basic
model.
Example 6. There are three consumers and one commodity. Each agent has an endowment
of three units of the commodity in each state. For each agent i, Ti ={ si,t i}. However, only
threestateshavepositiveprobability.Leta = (s1,t 2,t 3),b = (t1,s 2,t 3)andc = (t1,t 2,s 3).
Suppose q(a) = q(b) = q(c) = 1/3. Thus, agents 1, 2 and 3 can distinguish respectively
states a, b and c, and any two agent coalition can identify the true state by pooling the
information of its members. Since we are not concerned with incentive compatibility, it
will sufﬁce to consider state contingent allocations deﬁned on the three positive probability






















It is easy to see that the following allocation, y, belongs to the coarse core:
y(a) = (3,2,4), y(b) = (4,3,2), y(c) = (2,4,3).
However, coalition {1,3} has a ﬁne objection to y over the state c, since y1(c)+y3(c) < 6;
the event {t1}×T2 ×{ s3} is an admissible event for this coalition. In fact, the ﬁne core
in this example is empty. To see this, note that each agent must get at least three units in
the state that he can discern with his own information. Moreover, every two agent coalition
can identify each state with its pooled information, and must therefore get a total of at leastF. Forges et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 1–41 29
six units in each state. This means that no-trade is the only possible allocation which can
belong to the ﬁne core. However, that has a (coarse) objection by the grand coalition using
an allocation which is a perturbation of y, for example, y :
y (a) = (3 + 2 ,2 −  ,4 −  ), y (b) = (4 −  ,3 + 2 ,2 −  ),
y (c) = (2 −  ,4 −  ,3 + 2 ),
for   small enough.
Incidentally, this example also shows the importance of free disposal in Proposition 2;
recall footnote 23. The following allocation is in the ex ante core:
x(a) = (2.25,2.25,4.5), x(b) = (4.5,2.25,2.25), x(c) = (2.25,4.5,2.25).
Sinceinformationisnon-exclusive,thisallocationcanbeextendedsoastomakeitincentive
compatible. However, incentive compatibility will require that xi(t1,t 2,t 3) ≤ 2.25 for i =
1,2,3, and thus
 
i xi(t1,t 2,t 3)<
 
i ei.
Deﬁne the ex post core to be the set of all feasible mechanisms µ ∈ F such that for all t
such that q(t) > 0, µ(t) belongs to the core of the complete information economy in state
t. Clearly, the ex post core is generally non-empty. Since Example 6 concerns a single good
economy, the no-trade allocation is the only one in the ex post core. Example 6 also had
the feature that any allocation not in the ex post core had an ex post objection by some two
agent coalition. Since each two agent coalition can identify each state, such an objection is
also a ﬁne objection. This argument, showing that the ﬁne core is a subset of the ex post
core, can be applied to any economy in which the state can be identiﬁed by pooling the
information of agents in some coalition with an ex post objection. Einy et al. (2000) show
that this is generally the case in an atomless economy with a ﬁnite number of states. The
proof is based on the argument that in an atomless economy, if there is an objection in a
certain state, there exists an objection by an arbitrarily large coalition; see Vind (1972).
And with a ﬁnite number of states it is then possible to construct such a coalition in which
the state can be discerned by pooling the private information in the large coalition. The
following result is proved in Einy et al. (2000).
Proposition 9. In an atomless economy with a ﬁnite number of states such that pooled
information of all the agents corresponds to full information, the ﬁne core is contained in
the ex post core.
The coarse core and the ﬁne core correspond to two polar extremes; the former ruling out
pooling of information and the latter allowing for arbitrary forms of information pooling.
It is natural then, to explore a theory which provides a basis for making endogenous the
amount of private information that is shared within a coalition. There may be situations in
which some members of a coalition could credibly convince others in the coalition of an
event which is not common knowledge. Restricting attention to efﬁciency, Holmström and
Myerson (1983) study this issue by considering a proposal for the grand coalition which is
testedwithavotingprocedureandformalizethenotionofdurabledecisionrules.Adurable
decision rule is one to which there does not exist a threat from a proposal which is in some30 F. Forges et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 1–41
sense a credible objection to the status-quo even though it may not be an improvement over
a common knowledge event.
Similar ideas can be applied to a notion of the core in which coalitions are permitted to
carry out objections over events ﬁner than a common knowledge event. Consider Example
6again.Recallthatcoalition{1,3}hasaﬁneobjectiontoy whenthestateisc;forexample,
allocating 3−  to agent 1 and 3+  to agent 3. While this state is known to agent 3, should
agent 1 believe agent 3’s claim about the true state (even ignoring incentive compatibility)?
Agent 1 may fear that the true state is b but this can be dispelled if agent 3 offers his entire
endowmenttoagent1incasethestateisa orb.Inotherwords,whenagent1knowsthatthe
true state is either b or c, he should be willing to accept from agent 3 the proposal allocating
to him six units in b and 3−  in c. And agent 3 is better-off knowing the state to be c. Lee
and Volij (1996) term such an objection a coarse + objection. More generally, they deﬁne
a coarse + objection by coalition S as an objection over an event E which is common





a characterization of both the coarse core and the coarse + core in terms of consistency and
converse consistency axioms (with appropriately deﬁned reduced form games).
While the coarse + core may require an uninformed agent to gain in all the states that he
believes are possible, one could argue that it may be enough to convince such an agent of
the true state. For instance, consider Example 6 and the allocation y  which differs from y
only in state b:
y (a) = (3,2,4), y (b) = (6,3,0), y (c) = (2,4,3).
As before, there is a ﬁne objection from {1,3} in state c. But now this is not a coarse
+ objectionsinceagent3cannotoffermorethansixunitstoagent1instateb.Nevertheless,
itseemsreasonabletothinkthaty  isacredibleobjectiontoy sinceitisnotintheinterestof
agent3toproposethisunlessthestateisactuallyc,inwhichcaseboth1and3arebetter-off.
Theinterestsof1and3coincideandagent1cansafelydelegatetoagent3thedecisionabout
breaking away from the status-quo.36 The idea here is that of self-selection. An uninformed
agentcanassumethatifself-selectionindicatesthatacertainproposalwouldbemadebyan
agent of type t, then it is enough for an objection to be directed at the state t. This is the idea
(along with appropriate incentive compatibility constraints) on which the credible core of
Dutta and Vohra (2001) is based. It is not difﬁcult to see that if incentive constraints are not
imposed,thenthecrediblecorecoincideswiththeﬁnecoreandcan,therefore,beempty;see
DuttaandVohra(2001)foradditionalexampleswhichtakeaccountofincentiveconstraints.
For a model in which actions of agents at the interim stage reveal additional information
toothersseeIchiishiandSertel(1998).Abstractingfromincentiveconstraints,Volij(2000)
proposes a deﬁnition of the core that takes account of inferences drawn by agents based on
theacceptanceofaproposalbyothermembersofthecoalition.Heconstructsasequenceof
36 In Example 6, this argument would not change the coarse + core but other examples can be constructed where
this would make a difference.F. Forges et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 1–41 31
reﬁnementsoftheinformationpartitionofeachagentbasedonthetypesofotherswhowould
gain by accepting the new proposal. The limit of this procedure yields a new information
partition for each player. An objection is required to make each player better-off at each
step of the sequence, as well as in the limit.
5.4. The virtual utility approach




utilities at any particular state, i.e. without having to directly consider the corresponding
mechanism (across all states). This approach has been used by Myerson to develop a theory
of cooperative games under incomplete information. In particular, it has been elegantly
appliedinMyerson(1984b) toextendtheShapleyvaluetoanenvironmentwithincomplete
information. It has also been used in Myerson (1995) to generalize the notion of the inner
core to games with incomplete information in the context of a dynamic matching process.
Applying this approach to develop an interim core notion in an exchange economy will
undoubtedly add to our understanding of the issues discussed throughout this section. In
what follows we shall brieﬂy describe the approach and illustrate in a simple example how
the idea of virtual utility might be used to calculate a core-like solution.
The ﬁrst step is similar to the one used by Shapley and Harsanyi in deﬁning a value for
NTU games (see Myerson, 1991, Chapter 9, and Myerson, 1992). One associates to any
point on the Pareto efﬁcient frontier of the grand coalition a vector of supporting weights
and considers the ﬁctitious game in which individuals are allowed to transfer utility at the
rates speciﬁed by these weights. If the value of the modiﬁed transferable utility game is
feasible in the original game, it is a Harsanyi-Shapley value. The difﬁculty in extending this
approach to the case of incomplete information comes from the fact that allowing players
to transfer utilities at the interim stage may alter the incentive structure of the game, so that
the Pareto frontier of the modiﬁed game might be far removed from the one of the original
game. Myerson’s key insight is that there is an extension of the game, in which players
are allowed to transfer appropriately deﬁned virtual utilities in every state, which makes
it possible to associate a supporting linear Pareto frontier to any given incentive efﬁcient
mechanism of the original game, exactly as in the case of complete information.
To illustrate this idea, refer to the basic economy introduced in Section 2; assuming
for simplicity that the set of feasible allocation X is ﬁnite, the problem of ﬁnding incentive
efﬁcientmechanismsistomaximizethevectorofinterimexpectedutilitiesovertheincentive
constraints (2). With random mechanisms (see Section 4.3.2), these constraints deﬁne a
convexset.Thesupportinghyperplanetheoremthenallowsustoassociatewithanyincentive
efﬁcient mechanism µ, vectors λ ∈× i∈NRTi and α ∈× i∈NRTi×Ti such that, in every state
t ∈ T, µ(x|t) > 0 only if x maximizes
 
i vi(x,t,λ,α), where the term vi(x,t,λ,α)is
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andαi(si|ti)isthemultiplierassociatedwiththeconstraintthatindividuali shouldnothave
an incentive to declare si when his true type is ti (see Myerson, 1991, Theorem 10.1).
That is, any incentive efﬁcient mechanism selects allocations that are ex post efﬁcient in
the virtual utility scales: in bargaining over mechanisms each player is forced, by incentive
considerations, to act as if he was maximizing a distorted utility, which magniﬁes the
differences between his true type and types that would be tempted to imitate him.
Example 7. There are two consumers and two commodities. Suppose T1 ={ s,t} while
agent2isuninformed.Supposes andt areequallyprobable.Lete1 = (1,0)ande2 = (0,1).
u1(s,x1,x2) = 0.1x1 + x2 − 0.1,u 2(s,x1,x2) = 0.25x1 + x2 − 1.
u1(t,x1,x2) = x1 + x2 − 1,u 2(t,x1,x2) = 1.5x1 + x2 − 1.
The main difference with Example 1 is that now there are gains from trade in both states.
The constant terms allow us to identify no trade with the origin in the utility space. Utilities
are linear, and we can restrict attention to deterministic mechanisms. Any incentive efﬁ-
cient mechanism gives all of the ﬁrst good to player 2 in state s, and satisﬁes the incentive
constraint for type s with equality. The set of interim expected utilities that can be achieved
by means of incentive efﬁcient and interim individually rational mechanisms is a triangle
in R3 with vertices (U1(·|s),U1(·|t),U2(·)) equal to (0.075,0.075,0), (0.3375,0,0) and
(0,0,0.075).Usingconsumer1’snettradevectortoparameterizemechanisms,asinExam-
ple1,theﬁrstvertexcorrespondstothemechanismµ1 withnettradesz1(s) = (−1,0.175),
z1(t) = (0,0.075), the second to the mechanism µ2 with net trades z1(s) = (−1,0.4375),
z1(t) = (−0.375,0.375), the third to the mechanism µ3 with net trades z1(s) = (−1,0.1),
z1(t) = (0,0).
The utility allocations in the triangle correspond to the mechanisms in the incentive
compatible coarse core. Among these, µ1 is the one preferred by player 1 when he is of
type t, µ2 when he is of type s, and µ3 is the mechanism preferred by player 2.
Theshapeoftheutilityfrontierdeterminesthesupportingweights,λ1(s) = 2/9,λ1(t) =
7/9, λ2 = 1. Given these weights, the saddlepoint conditions for the Lagrangean give
α1(t|s) = 5/18 as the only non-zero multiplier. Inserting these values in the expression
above for virtual utilities, one can check that the only difference between virtual and real
utilitiesisthatinstatet thevirtualutilityofplayer1isv1(x1,x2,t,λ,α)= 1.5x1+x2−1.5.
In an effort to separate himself from the bad quality seller (type s), the good quality seller
(type t) acts as if he had an higher valuation of the good he owns.
The transferable virtual utility game in state s corresponds to the ex post economy in that
state,anditscorepayoffsarevectorsoftheform((y−0.1),(0.25−y)),withy ∈ [0.1,0.25].
Inthetransferablevirtualutilitygamecorrespondingtostatet therearenogainsfromtrade,
and the only payoff vector in the core is (0,0). These payoffs, when transformed in real
expected utilities, corresponds to the segment in R3 between the point (0,0,0.075) to the
point (0.15,0.05357,0), a line on the efﬁcient frontier which connects the vertex of the
triangle corresponding to player 2’s most preferred mechanism to a point on the opposite
side, where player 2 is down to his reservation utility.
Applying the virtual utility approach to this example thus allows us to identify a smaller
set of outcomes than the incentive compatible coarse core. To understand why, let us ﬁrstF. Forges et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 1–41 33
give an interpretation of the point (0.15,0.05357,0). This utility allocation lies on the line
connectingthevertexpreferredbyplayer1whenheisoftypes andthevertexpreferredwhen
heisoftypet,andcanthusbeinterpretedastheresultofacompromisebetweenthetwotypes
of player 1. The corresponding mechanism, µ4, generates net trades z1(s) = (−1,0.25),




is the natural outcome if player 1 has all the bargaining power but at the same time knows
that his proposals, being made at the interim stage, may convey information to player 2.
The line connecting this point to the vertex preferred by player 2 can then be given a
naturalinterpretation:itrepresentstheefﬁcientbargainingpossibilitiesactuallyavailableto
the two players. A point not on this line, even if incentive efﬁcient and interim individually
rational,isnotagoodcandidateforbeinganoutcomeofbargaining.Consider,forexample,
mechanism µ2, the one preferred by player 1 when his type is s. If he makes this proposal,
player 2 should deduce that the state is s and refuse to participate, because type t would
have done better with the ‘safe’ mechanism µ4.
In the usual interpretation of the core, in which a status-quo is tested against deviations,
this argument cannot be used to exclude µ2. Indeed, if µ2 is the status-quo, player 1 can
credibly signal that the state is t by proposing µ4, but he will not convince player 2 to
deviate, because µ2 gives to player 2 his best possible payoff in state t. Thus, the virtual
utilityapproachsuggestsanargumentforrulingoutµ2 whichisdifferentfromthose,based
on reﬁnements of the notion of domination, described in the previous section.
6. Replica economies and core convergence
The literature on the core of complete information economies offers two important in-
sights on the role played by the number of agents. First, the core of replicated economies
convergestothesetofWalrasianallocations,andinanatomlesseconomy,thecorecoincides
(even in the presence of non-convexities) with the set of Walrasian allocations. Second, the
non-emptinessofanapproximatecoreisguaranteedinalargeeconomy.Earlypapersonthis
topic are Aumman (1964)and Debreu and Scarf (1963); see Anderson (1994), Hildenbrand
(1982)andWooders(1994)forsurveys.Inthissection,weinvestigatetowhatextentsimilar
results hold for the two notions of the incentive compatible core discussed above.
A preliminary question concerns the deﬁnition of a large economy in the presence of
asymmetric information. The standard notion, which requires that each individual owns
only a negligible fraction of the aggregate endowment, is clearly not sufﬁcient. It might
well be the case that an individual, though negligible in terms of ownership of goods,
still maintains market power as the only owner of some relevant piece of information.
Informational smallness, as we saw in Section 4.3.1, is crucial in reducing the impact of
incentive compatibility constraints.
Clearly, if we replicate the economy in such a way that two copies of the same individual
have exactly the same information, the condition of non-exclusive information is immedi-
ately satisﬁed. With this type of ex post replication, incentive problems are absent in the34 F. Forges et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 1–41
replicated economy, the ex ante incentive compatible core coincides with the core of the
complete information economy and classical results are restored. Interestingly, as we will
see in Section 6.2, the convergence of the coarse core is problematic even in this simple
case.
GulandPostlewaite(1992)proposeadifferentformofreplication:typesareindependent
across replicas and the utility of each individual depends only on the types of the replica to
which he belongs. More precisely, given a basic economy E ={ N,(Ti,u i,e i)i∈N,q}, the
m-timesreplicatedeconomy,Em,isdeﬁnedasfollows.Individualsare(i,k) ∈ N×M,with
M ={ 1,2,...,m}. For every i, all the copies of i have the same set of types, Ti,k, a copy
of Ti. The set of types for the economy is thus, the product of m copies of the set of states
in the basic economy, ¯ Tm =× kTk, with Tk a copy of T, and we assume that the probability
distribution over ¯ Tm is ¯ qm =× kqk, the independent product of the probability distributions
over types in every replica, qk = q. For every i, all the copies of i have the same (state
independent) initial endowment, ei,k = ei. The utility of each individual depends only on
the types of other individuals in the same replica: for every (i,k), and every ¯ tm ∈ ¯ Tm, the
utility function of individual (i,k) over consumption in state ¯ tm is
ui,k(¯ tm,·) = ui(tk,·).
This kind of replication process tries to capture a situation in which each individual
maintainssometrulyprivateinformationeveninthereplicatedeconomy,buthisinformation
has a direct impact only on a small number of other individuals. As we will see next,
non-emptiness of an approximate ex ante incentive compatible core is indeed restored, but
convergence to the appropriate notion of competitive equilibrium may fail.
6.1. The ex ante core
Aswementionedabove,expostreplicationleadstonon-exclusiveinformationandtothe
non-emptiness of the core. Given that incentive compatibility constraints are not binding,
thecorrespondingequilibriumnotionisthefullinformationArrow–Debreuequilibriumand
convergence follows by standard arguments. Alternatively, one can follow Radner (1968)
and impose the requirement that an agent’s trades be measurable with respect to her private
information. Equilibrium allocations so deﬁned bear the standard relationship with the
private core (see Section 1.1.3), which similarly imposes such measurability restrictions;
see Einy et al. (2001a).37
When the economy is replicated in the way proposed by Gul and Postlewaite, on the
other hand, each individual’s information remains private even in the large economy and
we need a notion of competitive equilibrium which takes incentives into account.
Such a notion was proposed by Prescott and Townsend (1984b), who consider a model
in which the objects of trade are incentive compatible state contingent lotteries over con-
sumption. A bundle for individual (i,k) in economy Em is µi,k : ¯ Tm →  (Rl).
Anallocation,(µi,k)(i,k)∈N×M,speciﬁesanincentivecompatiblestate-contingentlottery
for every individual. It can be seen as a random mechanism for the grand coalition with
37 Einy et al. (2001b) provide conditions for the convergence of the ex post core to the set of fully revealing
rational expectations equilibrium allocations.F. Forges et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 1–41 35













to deﬁne the “modiﬁed incentive compatible core” of Allen (1992), because one averages
also across realization of information.
Lotteries over consumption are priced by the average amount of resources they use. For
a given vector p ∈ RL
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With these deﬁnitions in place, a competitive equilibrium consists of a price and an
allocation satisfying (11) such that each individual maximizes his expected utility over his
budget set. Let the average feasibility core refer to the ex ante incentive compatible core
with feasibility deﬁned as (11). Its non-emptiness can be proved directly, as in Proposition
5, or by showing that a competitive equilibrium exists and the corresponding allocation is
contained in this core. This notion of the core is useful in showing non-emptiness, in large
economies, of the ex ante core in which feasibility holds approximately in each state.
Indeed, by appealing to the law of large numbers, Forges et al. (2001) show that, if we
let m tend to inﬁnity, the replication of an allocation which is feasible on average in the
basic economy converges to an allocation which is feasible almost surely in the replicated
economy, and use this property to prove a non-emptiness result.
Let  >0 and δ>0. We say that x is ( ,δ)-feasible in Em if the probability of violating
feasibility by more than   (in norm) is less than δ. For any given ( ,δ), the ( ,δ)-ex ante
incentive compatible core deﬁned using this notion of feasibility is non-empty when the
number of replicas is large enough.
Proposition 10. For all  >0, and all δ>0 there exists M such that for all m ≥ M, the
( ,δ)-ex ante incentive compatible core is non-empty.
Thispropositionshowsonewayinwhichreplicashelpwiththenon-emptinessofanotion
of the incentive compatible approximate core.38 In particular, replicating sufﬁciently many
times the economy in Example 4 of Section 4.2 would guarantee the existence of such a
core. The special form of replication is crucial to be able to apply the law of large numbers.
Does this type of replication allow us to extend to economies with asymmetric information
the second classical result mentioned above, namely the core convergence theorem? The
following example, taken from Forges et al. (2001), illustrates the type of problems that
may arise: individuals who are ex ante identical are not treated equally in the core of the
replicated economy.
38 Non-emptiness results in large replica economies are also discussed, for the case of pure common values, in
McLean and Postlewaite (2000).36 F. Forges et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 1–41
Example 8. There are two consumers and two commodities. Suppose T1 ={ s,t} while
agent 2 is uninformed (and therefore has only one type). The information state can then be
described by s or t. Suppose s and t are equally probable. Let e1 = e2 = (1.5,1).
u1(s,x1,x2) = logx1 + x2,u 2(s,x1,x2) = 2logx1 + x2.
u1(t,x1,x2) = 2logx1 + x2,u 2(t,x1,x2) = logx1 + x2.
Thetwoindividualsarethusexanteidentical,buttherealizedtypeofindividual1determines
ex post which of the two has a higher utility from consumption of the ﬁrst good.
Consider the allocation ˆ x deﬁned by ˆ x1(s) =ˆ x2(t) = (1,1.5) and ˆ x1(t) =ˆ x2(s) =
(2,0.5). If we restrict attention to deterministic state - contingent allocations, ˆ x is (ex
ante) Pareto-optimal. Furthermore, it is easy to check that it is also incentive compatible
and individually rational. In particular, each individual obtains a gain from trade equal to
Ui(ˆ xi) − Ui(ei) = 0.085.
To show that ˆ x is in the (average feasibility) core of E we only have to check that ˆ x is
Pareto-optimal even when we allow for state-contingent lotteries, but this follows easily
from the concavity of the utility functions.
If we modify ˆ x by requiring an additional transfer of τ ≤ 0.085 units of good 2 from
individual2toindividual1ineachstate,wemaintainincentivecompatibilityandindividual
rationality, and we obtain an allocation ˜ x which also belong to the core of E.
We will show that (ˆ x, ˜ x) belongs to the core of the two-fold replicated economy E2,
thereby violating the equal treatment property.
Consider coalition {11,22}, formed by individual 1 in the ﬁrst replica and individual
2 in the second replica.39 In this coalition, if individual 11 must be guaranteed U1(ˆ x1),
individual 22 cannot get more than his reservation utility U2(e2), so that they do not have
a proﬁtable deviation.
To see this, consider the allocation ¯ x deﬁned by ¯ x11(s) = (1,1.5), ¯ x11(t) = (2,0.5),
¯ x22(s) = (1.5,0.5), ¯ x22(t) = (1.5,1.5). Individual 11 obtains the same bundle as in ˆ x,
while individual 22, whose utility does not depend on the type of individual 11, obtains
the same quantity of good 1 in both states. This allocation is incentive compatible and
individuallyrational.Furthermore, ¯ x maximizesthesumofexpectedutilitiesinthecoalition.
ByconstructionU1(¯ x11) = U1(ˆ x11),henceindividual22’sutilitycannotexceedU2(¯ x22) =
U2(e2), as claimed.
As the example makes clear, the dependence of the utility of a given individual on the
types of other individuals in his replica creates an ‘informational externality’ which breaks
the usual argument for equal treatment (see e.g. Debreu and Scarf, 1963). In the special
case of private values this externality is not present, and one may hope to get a positive
convergence result.
The basic economy is said to satisfy the assumption of independent private values if, as
in Section 4.3.1, ui(t,·) = ui(ti,·) and, moreover, q =× iqi, qi ∈  (Ti). The replicated
economy Em is obtained from E exactly as above, but now the utility of each individual
only depends on his own type and the fact of belonging to one replica or another is of no
39 Deviations by other coalitions can be easily ruled out.F. Forges et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 1–41 37
consequence. At an allocation in the core of the replicated economy, all the replicas of an
individual must obtain the same level of utility. Private values are crucial to the result, as
shown by the previous example. In Forges et al. (2001),this is used to prove.
Proposition11. Withindependentprivatevalues,ifanallocationµbelongstothe(average
feasibility) core of Em for all m ≥ 1, then µ is a competitive equilibrium allocation.
6.2. The interim core
Serrano et al. (2001) study the relationship between the interim cores and corresponding
price equilibrium notions for a replicated economy. They provide an example of a sunspot
economy in which core convergence does not obtain. Since they consider ex post replicas
(copies of the same agent have the same information), information is non-exclusive and the
negative result is thus independent of incentive constraints.
The example of non-convergence in Serrano et al. (2001) is most simply described with
respect to the coarse core and a price equilibrium concept which appears to have properties
likely to yield convergence. The price equilibrium concept is adapted from Wilson (1978)
and captures decision making at the interim stage. Let p denote a vector of state-contingent
market prices where p(t) ∈ Rl. For agent i of type ti, let Xi(ti) ={ xi(·,t i) ∈ Rl×|T−i|}
denote the set of relevant state contingent commodity bundles. The budget set of agent i of























contingent allocation x such that for all i and ti ∈ Ti, xi(·,t i) ∈ argmaxBi(p|ti)Ui(·|ti).
It is easy to see that constrained market equilibria satisfy several properties that are
analogous to those of Walrasian equilibria. In particular an equilibrium allocation belongs
tothecoarsecore40 andareplicationofanequilibriumallocationisanequilibriumallocation
of the corresponding replicated economy. This equilibrium notion thus provides a natural
benchmark to which one might expect coarse core allocations of replicated economies to
converge.
The result in Serrano et al. (2001) actually applies to any price equilibrium concept
which has the property that an agent who can discern an information state, in equilibrium,
maximizes his ex post utility given the prices corresponding to that state. More precisely,
the critical property for their result (satisﬁed by many price equilibrium notions) is
Property P. Suppose (x,p) is an equilibrium and there exists t ∈ T such that q(t|ti) = 1.
Then xi(t) ∈ argmaxBi(p|t)ui(t,·).
Serrano et al. (2001) consider a particularly simple type of differential information econ-
omy, a sunspot economy consisting of two states and two kinds of consumers—those who
40 As pointed out in footnote 6 in Wilson (1978). See also Goenka and Shell (1997).38 F. Forges et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 1–41
arefullyinformedandthosewhocannotdistinguishbetweeneitherstateattheinterimstage.
The basic economy, and any ex post replication of it, can be seen as a restricted market par-
ticipation economy of Cass and Shell (1983) in which informed consumers can participate
only in spot markets. Moreover, a sunspot equilibrium is identical to a constrained market
equilibrium. In equilibrium, informed agents maximize ex post utility subject to their ex
post budget constraint, while uninformed consumers maximize expected utility subject to
a single budget constraint (involving contingent commodities). The example is as follows.
Example 9. The basic economy, E, consists to two agents and two commodities. There
are two equally probable (sunspot) states s and t. Agent 1 is uniformed while agent 2 is
fully informed. Thus, we can identify the states with the types of agent 2, T2 ={ s,t}. The
endowments and preferences are independent of the state and both agents have identical
(ex post) utility functions:
e1 = (0,24), e2 = (24,0)
ui(r,x1,x2) = (x1x2)1/4 forr = s,t and i = 1,2.
In this simple sunspot economy, with prices suitably normalized, there is a unique con-
strained market equilibrium which is also a sunspot equilibrium as well as rational expec-
tations equilibrium; this equilibrium is (¯ x, ¯ p), where
¯ xi(r) = (12,12), and ¯ p(r) = (1/4,1/4) forallr = s,t and i = 1,2.
Of course, ¯ x belongs the coarse core, and a replication of ¯ x along with ¯ p is the unique
equilibrium in the replicated economy.
Coarsecoreallocationsinthiseconomyneednotsatisfytheequaltreatmentproperty,but
for a completely different reason than the one explaining Example 8. Indeed, in a sunspot
economyvaluesareprivate,andthereisno‘informationalexternality’ofthekinddescribed
in the previous section. The problem results from the fact that a coarse improvement by




In the present example, there exists an allocation x such that the m-th replication of x
belongs to the coarse core of Em for all m but x  =¯ x, i.e. x is not a sunspot equilibrium
allocation.41 There are several allocations with this feature, including the following:
x1(s) = (9,9), x1(t) = (16,16)
x2(s) = (15,15), x2(t) = (8,8).
Note that this allocation cannot be an equilibrium allocation for any equilibrium notion
satisfying Property P; the commodity bundle (8,8) is not on the offer curve of the informed
consumer in state t.
41 SeeSerranoetal.(2001)fordetails.Notethatinourframework,thenumberoftypesincreaseswithreplication
(eventhoughthereareonlytwounderlyingstatesoftheworld)butonecanneverthelessconcentrateonallocations
for information states with positive probability.F. Forges et al./Journal of Mathematical Economics 38 (2002) 1–41 39
It is instructive to see why x remains in the coarse for every replication. The standard
Debreu-Scarf argument for ruling out x from the ‘core’ of a large economy would proceed
by constructing a coalition containing a relatively small number of informed agents in state
s and a relatively large number of informed agents in state t. But such a ‘coalition’ would
have no meaning in the present context; a coalition must have the same number of informed
consumers in each state.
As argued in Serrano et al. (2001), non-convergence pertains not only to the coarse
core but to a variety of other interim core notions as well price equilibrium concepts.42 In
particular, it is possible to construct an example of an economy (not a sunspot economy) in
which there is a constant (hence measurable) allocation which belongs to the core of each
replicated economy but is not a price equilibrium allocation. Thus, non-convergence of the
interim core to price equilibrium allocations is a robust phenomenon.
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